rfc7230 Varnish source references

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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                  R. Fielding, Ed.
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Request for Comments: 7230                                         Adobe
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Obsoletes: 2145, 2616                                    J. Reschke, Ed.
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Updates: 2817, 2818                                           greenbytes
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Category: Standards Track                                      June 2014
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ISSN: 2070-1721
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   Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing
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Abstract
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   The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-
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   level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information
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   systems.  This document provides an overview of HTTP architecture and
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   its associated terminology, defines the "http" and "https" Uniform
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   Resource Identifier (URI) schemes, defines the HTTP/1.1 message
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   syntax and parsing requirements, and describes related security
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   concerns for implementations.
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Status of This Memo
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   This is an Internet Standards Track document.
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   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
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   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
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   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
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   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
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   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
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   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
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   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
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   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230.
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Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                    [Page 1]
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RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
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Copyright Notice
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   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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   document authors.  All rights reserved.
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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.
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   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
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   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
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   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
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   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
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   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
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   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
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   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
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   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
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   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
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   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
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   than English.
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Table of Contents
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   1. Introduction ....................................................5
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      1.1. Requirements Notation ......................................6
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      1.2. Syntax Notation ............................................6
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   2. Architecture ....................................................6
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      2.1. Client/Server Messaging ....................................7
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      2.2. Implementation Diversity ...................................8
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      2.3. Intermediaries .............................................9
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      2.4. Caches ....................................................11
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      2.5. Conformance and Error Handling ............................12
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      2.6. Protocol Versioning .......................................13
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      2.7. Uniform Resource Identifiers ..............................16
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           2.7.1. http URI Scheme ....................................17
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           2.7.2. https URI Scheme ...................................18
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           2.7.3. http and https URI Normalization and Comparison ....19
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   3. Message Format .................................................19
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      3.1. Start Line ................................................20
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           3.1.1. Request Line .......................................21
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           3.1.2. Status Line ........................................22
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      3.2. Header Fields .............................................22
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           3.2.1. Field Extensibility ................................23
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           3.2.2. Field Order ........................................23
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           3.2.3. Whitespace .........................................24
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           3.2.4. Field Parsing ......................................25
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           3.2.5. Field Limits .......................................26
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           3.2.6. Field Value Components .............................27
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      3.3. Message Body ..............................................28
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           3.3.1. Transfer-Encoding ..................................28
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           3.3.2. Content-Length .....................................30
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           3.3.3. Message Body Length ................................32
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      3.4. Handling Incomplete Messages ..............................34
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      3.5. Message Parsing Robustness ................................34
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   4. Transfer Codings ...............................................35
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      4.1. Chunked Transfer Coding ...................................36
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           4.1.1. Chunk Extensions ...................................36
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           4.1.2. Chunked Trailer Part ...............................37
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           4.1.3. Decoding Chunked ...................................38
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      4.2. Compression Codings .......................................38
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           4.2.1. Compress Coding ....................................38
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           4.2.2. Deflate Coding .....................................38
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           4.2.3. Gzip Coding ........................................39
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      4.3. TE ........................................................39
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      4.4. Trailer ...................................................40
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   5. Message Routing ................................................40
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      5.1. Identifying a Target Resource .............................40
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      5.2. Connecting Inbound ........................................41
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      5.3. Request Target ............................................41
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           5.3.1. origin-form ........................................42
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           5.3.2. absolute-form ......................................42
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           5.3.3. authority-form .....................................43
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           5.3.4. asterisk-form ......................................43
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      5.4. Host ......................................................44
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      5.5. Effective Request URI .....................................45
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      5.6. Associating a Response to a Request .......................46
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      5.7. Message Forwarding ........................................47
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           5.7.1. Via ................................................47
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           5.7.2. Transformations ....................................49
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   6. Connection Management ..........................................50
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      6.1. Connection ................................................51
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      6.2. Establishment .............................................52
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      6.3. Persistence ...............................................52
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           6.3.1. Retrying Requests ..................................53
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           6.3.2. Pipelining .........................................54
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      6.4. Concurrency ...............................................55
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      6.5. Failures and Timeouts .....................................55
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      6.6. Tear-down .................................................56
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      6.7. Upgrade ...................................................57
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   7. ABNF List Extension: #rule .....................................59
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   8. IANA Considerations ............................................61
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      8.1. Header Field Registration .................................61
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      8.2. URI Scheme Registration ...................................62
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      8.3. Internet Media Type Registration ..........................62
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           8.3.1. Internet Media Type message/http ...................62
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           8.3.2. Internet Media Type application/http ...............63
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      8.4. Transfer Coding Registry ..................................64
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           8.4.1. Procedure ..........................................65
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           8.4.2. Registration .......................................65
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      8.5. Content Coding Registration ...............................66
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      8.6. Upgrade Token Registry ....................................66
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           8.6.1. Procedure ..........................................66
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           8.6.2. Upgrade Token Registration .........................67
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   9. Security Considerations ........................................67
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      9.1. Establishing Authority ....................................67
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      9.2. Risks of Intermediaries ...................................68
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      9.3. Attacks via Protocol Element Length .......................69
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      9.4. Response Splitting ........................................69
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      9.5. Request Smuggling .........................................70
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      9.6. Message Integrity .........................................70
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      9.7. Message Confidentiality ...................................71
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      9.8. Privacy of Server Log Information .........................71
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   10. Acknowledgments ...............................................72
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   11. References ....................................................74
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      11.1. Normative References .....................................74
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      11.2. Informative References ...................................75
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   Appendix A. HTTP Version History ..................................78
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      A.1. Changes from HTTP/1.0  ....................................78
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           A.1.1.  Multihomed Web Servers ............................78
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           A.1.2.  Keep-Alive Connections ............................79
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           A.1.3.  Introduction of Transfer-Encoding .................79
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      A.2.  Changes from RFC 2616 ....................................80
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   Appendix B. Collected ABNF ........................................82
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   Index .............................................................85
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1.  Introduction
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   The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-
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   level request/response protocol that uses extensible semantics and
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   self-descriptive message payloads for flexible interaction with
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   network-based hypertext information systems.  This document is the
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   first in a series of documents that collectively form the HTTP/1.1
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   specification:
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   1.  "Message Syntax and Routing" (this document)
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   2.  "Semantics and Content" [RFC7231]
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   3.  "Conditional Requests" [RFC7232]
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   4.  "Range Requests" [RFC7233]
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   5.  "Caching" [RFC7234]
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   6.  "Authentication" [RFC7235]
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   This HTTP/1.1 specification obsoletes RFC 2616 and RFC 2145 (on HTTP
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   versioning).  This specification also updates the use of CONNECT to
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   establish a tunnel, previously defined in RFC 2817, and defines the
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   "https" URI scheme that was described informally in RFC 2818.
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   HTTP is a generic interface protocol for information systems.  It is
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   designed to hide the details of how a service is implemented by
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   presenting a uniform interface to clients that is independent of the
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   types of resources provided.  Likewise, servers do not need to be
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   aware of each client's purpose: an HTTP request can be considered in
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   isolation rather than being associated with a specific type of client
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   or a predetermined sequence of application steps.  The result is a
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   protocol that can be used effectively in many different contexts and
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   for which implementations can evolve independently over time.
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   HTTP is also designed for use as an intermediation protocol for
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   translating communication to and from non-HTTP information systems.
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   HTTP proxies and gateways can provide access to alternative
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   information services by translating their diverse protocols into a
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   hypertext format that can be viewed and manipulated by clients in the
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   same way as HTTP services.
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   One consequence of this flexibility is that the protocol cannot be
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   defined in terms of what occurs behind the interface.  Instead, we
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   are limited to defining the syntax of communication, the intent of
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   received communication, and the expected behavior of recipients.  If
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   the communication is considered in isolation, then successful actions
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   ought to be reflected in corresponding changes to the observable
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   interface provided by servers.  However, since multiple clients might
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   act in parallel and perhaps at cross-purposes, we cannot require that
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   such changes be observable beyond the scope of a single response.
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   This document describes the architectural elements that are used or
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   referred to in HTTP, defines the "http" and "https" URI schemes,
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   describes overall network operation and connection management, and
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   defines HTTP message framing and forwarding requirements.  Our goal
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   is to define all of the mechanisms necessary for HTTP message
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   handling that are independent of message semantics, thereby defining
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   the complete set of requirements for message parsers and message-
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   forwarding intermediaries.
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1.1.  Requirements Notation
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   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
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   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
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   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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   Conformance criteria and considerations regarding error handling are
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   defined in Section 2.5.
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1.2.  Syntax Notation
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   This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
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   notation of [RFC5234] with a list extension, defined in Section 7,
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   that allows for compact definition of comma-separated lists using a
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   '#' operator (similar to how the '*' operator indicates repetition).
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   Appendix B shows the collected grammar with all list operators
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   expanded to standard ABNF notation.
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   The following core rules are included by reference, as defined in
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   [RFC5234], Appendix B.1: ALPHA (letters), CR (carriage return), CRLF
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   (CR LF), CTL (controls), DIGIT (decimal 0-9), DQUOTE (double quote),
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   HEXDIG (hexadecimal 0-9/A-F/a-f), HTAB (horizontal tab), LF (line
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   feed), OCTET (any 8-bit sequence of data), SP (space), and VCHAR (any
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   visible [USASCII] character).
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   As a convention, ABNF rule names prefixed with "obs-" denote
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   "obsolete" grammar rules that appear for historical reasons.
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2.  Architecture
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   HTTP was created for the World Wide Web (WWW) architecture and has
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   evolved over time to support the scalability needs of a worldwide
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   hypertext system.  Much of that architecture is reflected in the
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   terminology and syntax productions used to define HTTP.
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2.1.  Client/Server Messaging
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   HTTP is a stateless request/response protocol that operates by
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   exchanging messages (Section 3) across a reliable transport- or
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   session-layer "connection" (Section 6).  An HTTP "client" is a
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   program that establishes a connection to a server for the purpose of
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   sending one or more HTTP requests.  An HTTP "server" is a program
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   that accepts connections in order to service HTTP requests by sending
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   HTTP responses.
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   The terms "client" and "server" refer only to the roles that these
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   programs perform for a particular connection.  The same program might
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   act as a client on some connections and a server on others.  The term
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   "user agent" refers to any of the various client programs that
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   initiate a request, including (but not limited to) browsers, spiders
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   (web-based robots), command-line tools, custom applications, and
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   mobile apps.  The term "origin server" refers to the program that can
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   originate authoritative responses for a given target resource.  The
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   terms "sender" and "recipient" refer to any implementation that sends
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   or receives a given message, respectively.
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   HTTP relies upon the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) standard
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   [RFC3986] to indicate the target resource (Section 5.1) and
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   relationships between resources.  Messages are passed in a format
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   similar to that used by Internet mail [RFC5322] and the Multipurpose
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   Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) [RFC2045] (see Appendix A of
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   [RFC7231] for the differences between HTTP and MIME messages).
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   Most HTTP communication consists of a retrieval request (GET) for a
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   representation of some resource identified by a URI.  In the simplest
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   case, this might be accomplished via a single bidirectional
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   connection (===) between the user agent (UA) and the origin
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   server (O).
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            request   >
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       UA ======================================= O
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                                   <   response
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   A client sends an HTTP request to a server in the form of a request
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   message, beginning with a request-line that includes a method, URI,
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   and protocol version (Section 3.1.1), followed by header fields
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   containing request modifiers, client information, and representation
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   metadata (Section 3.2), an empty line to indicate the end of the
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   header section, and finally a message body containing the payload
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   body (if any, Section 3.3).
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   A server responds to a client's request by sending one or more HTTP
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   response messages, each beginning with a status line that includes
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   the protocol version, a success or error code, and textual reason
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   phrase (Section 3.1.2), possibly followed by header fields containing
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   server information, resource metadata, and representation metadata
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   (Section 3.2), an empty line to indicate the end of the header
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   section, and finally a message body containing the payload body (if
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   any, Section 3.3).
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   A connection might be used for multiple request/response exchanges,
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   as defined in Section 6.3.
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   The following example illustrates a typical message exchange for a
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   GET request (Section 4.3.1 of [RFC7231]) on the URI
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   "http://www.example.com/hello.txt":
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   Client request:
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     GET /hello.txt HTTP/1.1
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     User-Agent: curl/7.16.3 libcurl/7.16.3 OpenSSL/0.9.7l zlib/1.2.3
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     Host: www.example.com
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     Accept-Language: en, mi
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   Server response:
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     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
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     Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2009 12:28:53 GMT
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     Server: Apache
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     Last-Modified: Wed, 22 Jul 2009 19:15:56 GMT
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     ETag: "34aa387-d-1568eb00"
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     Accept-Ranges: bytes
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     Content-Length: 51
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     Vary: Accept-Encoding
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     Content-Type: text/plain
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     Hello World! My payload includes a trailing CRLF.
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2.2.  Implementation Diversity
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   When considering the design of HTTP, it is easy to fall into a trap
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   of thinking that all user agents are general-purpose browsers and all
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   origin servers are large public websites.  That is not the case in
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   practice.  Common HTTP user agents include household appliances,
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   stereos, scales, firmware update scripts, command-line programs,
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   mobile apps, and communication devices in a multitude of shapes and
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   sizes.  Likewise, common HTTP origin servers include home automation
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   units, configurable networking components, office machines,
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   autonomous robots, news feeds, traffic cameras, ad selectors, and
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   video-delivery platforms.
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   The term "user agent" does not imply that there is a human user
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   directly interacting with the software agent at the time of a
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   request.  In many cases, a user agent is installed or configured to
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   run in the background and save its results for later inspection (or
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   save only a subset of those results that might be interesting or
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   erroneous).  Spiders, for example, are typically given a start URI
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   and configured to follow certain behavior while crawling the Web as a
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   hypertext graph.
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   The implementation diversity of HTTP means that not all user agents
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   can make interactive suggestions to their user or provide adequate
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   warning for security or privacy concerns.  In the few cases where
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   this specification requires reporting of errors to the user, it is
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   acceptable for such reporting to only be observable in an error
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   console or log file.  Likewise, requirements that an automated action
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   be confirmed by the user before proceeding might be met via advance
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   configuration choices, run-time options, or simple avoidance of the
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   unsafe action; confirmation does not imply any specific user
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   interface or interruption of normal processing if the user has
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   already made that choice.
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2.3.  Intermediaries
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   HTTP enables the use of intermediaries to satisfy requests through a
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   chain of connections.  There are three common forms of HTTP
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   intermediary: proxy, gateway, and tunnel.  In some cases, a single
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   intermediary might act as an origin server, proxy, gateway, or
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   tunnel, switching behavior based on the nature of each request.
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            >             >             >             >
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       UA =========== A =========== B =========== C =========== O
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                  <             <             <             <
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   The figure above shows three intermediaries (A, B, and C) between the
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   user agent and origin server.  A request or response message that
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   travels the whole chain will pass through four separate connections.
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   Some HTTP communication options might apply only to the connection
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   with the nearest, non-tunnel neighbor, only to the endpoints of the
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   chain, or to all connections along the chain.  Although the diagram
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   is linear, each participant might be engaged in multiple,
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   simultaneous communications.  For example, B might be receiving
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   requests from many clients other than A, and/or forwarding requests
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   to servers other than C, at the same time that it is handling A's
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   request.  Likewise, later requests might be sent through a different
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   path of connections, often based on dynamic configuration for load
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   balancing.
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   The terms "upstream" and "downstream" are used to describe
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   directional requirements in relation to the message flow: all
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   messages flow from upstream to downstream.  The terms "inbound" and
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   "outbound" are used to describe directional requirements in relation
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   to the request route: "inbound" means toward the origin server and
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   "outbound" means toward the user agent.
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   A "proxy" is a message-forwarding agent that is selected by the
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   client, usually via local configuration rules, to receive requests
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   for some type(s) of absolute URI and attempt to satisfy those
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   requests via translation through the HTTP interface.  Some
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   translations are minimal, such as for proxy requests for "http" URIs,
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   whereas other requests might require translation to and from entirely
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   different application-level protocols.  Proxies are often used to
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   group an organization's HTTP requests through a common intermediary
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   for the sake of security, annotation services, or shared caching.
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   Some proxies are designed to apply transformations to selected
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   messages or payloads while they are being forwarded, as described in
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   Section 5.7.2.
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   A "gateway" (a.k.a. "reverse proxy") is an intermediary that acts as
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   an origin server for the outbound connection but translates received
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   requests and forwards them inbound to another server or servers.
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   Gateways are often used to encapsulate legacy or untrusted
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   information services, to improve server performance through
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   "accelerator" caching, and to enable partitioning or load balancing
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   of HTTP services across multiple machines.
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   All HTTP requirements applicable to an origin server also apply to
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   the outbound communication of a gateway.  A gateway communicates with
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   inbound servers using any protocol that it desires, including private
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   extensions to HTTP that are outside the scope of this specification.
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   However, an HTTP-to-HTTP gateway that wishes to interoperate with
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   third-party HTTP servers ought to conform to user agent requirements
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   on the gateway's inbound connection.
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   A "tunnel" acts as a blind relay between two connections without
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   changing the messages.  Once active, a tunnel is not considered a
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   party to the HTTP communication, though the tunnel might have been
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   initiated by an HTTP request.  A tunnel ceases to exist when both
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   ends of the relayed connection are closed.  Tunnels are used to
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   extend a virtual connection through an intermediary, such as when
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   Transport Layer Security (TLS, [RFC5246]) is used to establish
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   confidential communication through a shared firewall proxy.
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   The above categories for intermediary only consider those acting as
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   participants in the HTTP communication.  There are also
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   intermediaries that can act on lower layers of the network protocol
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   stack, filtering or redirecting HTTP traffic without the knowledge or
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   permission of message senders.  Network intermediaries are
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   indistinguishable (at a protocol level) from a man-in-the-middle
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   attack, often introducing security flaws or interoperability problems
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   due to mistakenly violating HTTP semantics.
 575
 576
   For example, an "interception proxy" [RFC3040] (also commonly known
 577
   as a "transparent proxy" [RFC1919] or "captive portal") differs from
 578
   an HTTP proxy because it is not selected by the client.  Instead, an
 579
   interception proxy filters or redirects outgoing TCP port 80 packets
 580
   (and occasionally other common port traffic).  Interception proxies
 581
   are commonly found on public network access points, as a means of
 582
   enforcing account subscription prior to allowing use of non-local
 583
   Internet services, and within corporate firewalls to enforce network
 584
   usage policies.
 585
 586
   HTTP is defined as a stateless protocol, meaning that each request
 587
   message can be understood in isolation.  Many implementations depend
 588
   on HTTP's stateless design in order to reuse proxied connections or
 589
   dynamically load balance requests across multiple servers.  Hence, a
 590
   server MUST NOT assume that two requests on the same connection are
 591
   from the same user agent unless the connection is secured and
 592
   specific to that agent.  Some non-standard HTTP extensions (e.g.,
 593
   [RFC4559]) have been known to violate this requirement, resulting in
 594
   security and interoperability problems.
 595
 596
2.4.  Caches
 597
 598
   A "cache" is a local store of previous response messages and the
 599
   subsystem that controls its message storage, retrieval, and deletion.
 600
   A cache stores cacheable responses in order to reduce the response
 601
   time and network bandwidth consumption on future, equivalent
 602
   requests.  Any client or server MAY employ a cache, though a cache
 603
   cannot be used by a server while it is acting as a tunnel.
 604
 605
   The effect of a cache is that the request/response chain is shortened
 606
   if one of the participants along the chain has a cached response
 607
   applicable to that request.  The following illustrates the resulting
 608
   chain if B has a cached copy of an earlier response from O (via C)
 609
   for a request that has not been cached by UA or A.
 610
 611
               >             >
 612
          UA =========== A =========== B - - - - - - C - - - - - - O
 613
                     <             <
 614
 615
 616
 617
 618
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 621
 622
 623
   A response is "cacheable" if a cache is allowed to store a copy of
 624
   the response message for use in answering subsequent requests.  Even
 625
   when a response is cacheable, there might be additional constraints
 626
   placed by the client or by the origin server on when that cached
 627
   response can be used for a particular request.  HTTP requirements for
 628
   cache behavior and cacheable responses are defined in Section 2 of
 629
   [RFC7234].
 630
 631
   There is a wide variety of architectures and configurations of caches
 632
   deployed across the World Wide Web and inside large organizations.
 633
   These include national hierarchies of proxy caches to save
 634
   transoceanic bandwidth, collaborative systems that broadcast or
 635
   multicast cache entries, archives of pre-fetched cache entries for
 636
   use in off-line or high-latency environments, and so on.
 637
 638
2.5.  Conformance and Error Handling
 639
 640
   This specification targets conformance criteria according to the role
 641
   of a participant in HTTP communication.  Hence, HTTP requirements are
 642
   placed on senders, recipients, clients, servers, user agents,
 643
   intermediaries, origin servers, proxies, gateways, or caches,
 644
   depending on what behavior is being constrained by the requirement.
 645
   Additional (social) requirements are placed on implementations,
 646
   resource owners, and protocol element registrations when they apply
 647
   beyond the scope of a single communication.
 648
 649
   The verb "generate" is used instead of "send" where a requirement
 650
   differentiates between creating a protocol element and merely
 651
   forwarding a received element downstream.
 652
 653
   An implementation is considered conformant if it complies with all of
 654
   the requirements associated with the roles it partakes in HTTP.
 655
 656
   Conformance includes both the syntax and semantics of protocol
 657
   elements.  A sender MUST NOT generate protocol elements that convey a
 658
   meaning that is known by that sender to be false.  A sender MUST NOT
 659
   generate protocol elements that do not match the grammar defined by
 660
   the corresponding ABNF rules.  Within a given message, a sender MUST
 661
   NOT generate protocol elements or syntax alternatives that are only
 662
   allowed to be generated by participants in other roles (i.e., a role
 663
   that the sender does not have for that message).
 664
 665
   When a received protocol element is parsed, the recipient MUST be
 666
   able to parse any value of reasonable length that is applicable to
 667
   the recipient's role and that matches the grammar defined by the
 668
   corresponding ABNF rules.  Note, however, that some received protocol
 669
   elements might not be parsed.  For example, an intermediary
 670
 671
 672
 673
 674
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 12]
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 677
 678
 679
   forwarding a message might parse a header-field into generic
 680
   field-name and field-value components, but then forward the header
 681
   field without further parsing inside the field-value.
 682
 683
   HTTP does not have specific length limitations for many of its
 684
   protocol elements because the lengths that might be appropriate will
 685
   vary widely, depending on the deployment context and purpose of the
 686
   implementation.  Hence, interoperability between senders and
 687
   recipients depends on shared expectations regarding what is a
 688
   reasonable length for each protocol element.  Furthermore, what is
 689
   commonly understood to be a reasonable length for some protocol
 690
   elements has changed over the course of the past two decades of HTTP
 691
   use and is expected to continue changing in the future.
 692
 693
   At a minimum, a recipient MUST be able to parse and process protocol
 694
   element lengths that are at least as long as the values that it
 695
   generates for those same protocol elements in other messages.  For
 696
   example, an origin server that publishes very long URI references to
 697
   its own resources needs to be able to parse and process those same
 698
   references when received as a request target.
 699
 700
   A recipient MUST interpret a received protocol element according to
 701
   the semantics defined for it by this specification, including
 702
   extensions to this specification, unless the recipient has determined
 703
   (through experience or configuration) that the sender incorrectly
 704
   implements what is implied by those semantics.  For example, an
 705
   origin server might disregard the contents of a received
 706
   Accept-Encoding header field if inspection of the User-Agent header
 707
   field indicates a specific implementation version that is known to
 708
   fail on receipt of certain content codings.
 709
 710
   Unless noted otherwise, a recipient MAY attempt to recover a usable
 711
   protocol element from an invalid construct.  HTTP does not define
 712
   specific error handling mechanisms except when they have a direct
 713
   impact on security, since different applications of the protocol
 714
   require different error handling strategies.  For example, a Web
 715
   browser might wish to transparently recover from a response where the
 716
   Location header field doesn't parse according to the ABNF, whereas a
 717
   systems control client might consider any form of error recovery to
 718
   be dangerous.
 719
 720
2.6.  Protocol Versioning
 721
 722
   HTTP uses a "<major>.<minor>" numbering scheme to indicate versions
 723
   of the protocol.  This specification defines version "1.1".  The
 724
   protocol version as a whole indicates the sender's conformance with
 725
   the set of requirements laid out in that version's corresponding
 726
   specification of HTTP.
 727
 728
 729
 730
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 733
 734
 735
   The version of an HTTP message is indicated by an HTTP-version field
 736
   in the first line of the message.  HTTP-version is case-sensitive.
 737
 738
     HTTP-version  = HTTP-name "/" DIGIT "." DIGIT
 739
     HTTP-name     = %x48.54.54.50 ; "HTTP", case-sensitive
 740
 741
   The HTTP version number consists of two decimal digits separated by a
 742
   "." (period or decimal point).  The first digit ("major version")
 743
   indicates the HTTP messaging syntax, whereas the second digit ("minor
 744
   version") indicates the highest minor version within that major
 745
   version to which the sender is conformant and able to understand for
 746
   future communication.  The minor version advertises the sender's
 747
   communication capabilities even when the sender is only using a
 748
   backwards-compatible subset of the protocol, thereby letting the
 749
   recipient know that more advanced features can be used in response
 750
   (by servers) or in future requests (by clients).
 751
 752
   When an HTTP/1.1 message is sent to an HTTP/1.0 recipient [RFC1945]
 753
   or a recipient whose version is unknown, the HTTP/1.1 message is
 754
   constructed such that it can be interpreted as a valid HTTP/1.0
 755
   message if all of the newer features are ignored.  This specification
 756
   places recipient-version requirements on some new features so that a
 757
   conformant sender will only use compatible features until it has
 758
   determined, through configuration or the receipt of a message, that
 759
   the recipient supports HTTP/1.1.
 760
 761
   The interpretation of a header field does not change between minor
 762
   versions of the same major HTTP version, though the default behavior
 763
   of a recipient in the absence of such a field can change.  Unless
 764
   specified otherwise, header fields defined in HTTP/1.1 are defined
 765
   for all versions of HTTP/1.x.  In particular, the Host and Connection
 766
   header fields ought to be implemented by all HTTP/1.x implementations
 767
   whether or not they advertise conformance with HTTP/1.1.
 768
 769
   New header fields can be introduced without changing the protocol
 770
   version if their defined semantics allow them to be safely ignored by
 771
   recipients that do not recognize them.  Header field extensibility is
 772
   discussed in Section 3.2.1.
 773
 774
   Intermediaries that process HTTP messages (i.e., all intermediaries
 775
   other than those acting as tunnels) MUST send their own HTTP-version
 776
   in forwarded messages.  In other words, they are not allowed to
 777
   blindly forward the first line of an HTTP message without ensuring
 778
   that the protocol version in that message matches a version to which
 779
   that intermediary is conformant for both the receiving and sending of
 780
   messages.  Forwarding an HTTP message without rewriting the
 781
 782
 783
 784
 785
 786
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 14]
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 789
 790
 791
   HTTP-version might result in communication errors when downstream
 792
   recipients use the message sender's version to determine what
 793
   features are safe to use for later communication with that sender.
 794
 795
   A client SHOULD send a request version equal to the highest version
 796
   to which the client is conformant and whose major version is no
 797
   higher than the highest version supported by the server, if this is
 798
   known.  A client MUST NOT send a version to which it is not
 799
   conformant.
 800
 801
   A client MAY send a lower request version if it is known that the
 802
   server incorrectly implements the HTTP specification, but only after
 803
   the client has attempted at least one normal request and determined
 804
   from the response status code or header fields (e.g., Server) that
 805
   the server improperly handles higher request versions.
 806
 807
   A server SHOULD send a response version equal to the highest version
 808
   to which the server is conformant that has a major version less than
 809
   or equal to the one received in the request.  A server MUST NOT send
 810
   a version to which it is not conformant.  A server can send a 505
 811
   (HTTP Version Not Supported) response if it wishes, for any reason,
 812
   to refuse service of the client's major protocol version.
 813
 814
   A server MAY send an HTTP/1.0 response to a request if it is known or
 815
   suspected that the client incorrectly implements the HTTP
 816
   specification and is incapable of correctly processing later version
 817
   responses, such as when a client fails to parse the version number
 818
   correctly or when an intermediary is known to blindly forward the
 819
   HTTP-version even when it doesn't conform to the given minor version
 820
   of the protocol.  Such protocol downgrades SHOULD NOT be performed
 821
   unless triggered by specific client attributes, such as when one or
 822
   more of the request header fields (e.g., User-Agent) uniquely match
 823
   the values sent by a client known to be in error.
 824
 825
   The intention of HTTP's versioning design is that the major number
 826
   will only be incremented if an incompatible message syntax is
 827
   introduced, and that the minor number will only be incremented when
 828
   changes made to the protocol have the effect of adding to the message
 829
   semantics or implying additional capabilities of the sender.
 830
   However, the minor version was not incremented for the changes
 831
   introduced between [RFC2068] and [RFC2616], and this revision has
 832
   specifically avoided any such changes to the protocol.
 833
 834
   When an HTTP message is received with a major version number that the
 835
   recipient implements, but a higher minor version number than what the
 836
   recipient implements, the recipient SHOULD process the message as if
 837
   it were in the highest minor version within that major version to
 838
   which the recipient is conformant.  A recipient can assume that a
 839
 840
 841
 842
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 15]
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 845
 846
 847
   message with a higher minor version, when sent to a recipient that
 848
   has not yet indicated support for that higher version, is
 849
   sufficiently backwards-compatible to be safely processed by any
 850
   implementation of the same major version.
 851
 852
2.7.  Uniform Resource Identifiers
 853
 854
   Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) [RFC3986] are used throughout
 855
   HTTP as the means for identifying resources (Section 2 of [RFC7231]).
 856
   URI references are used to target requests, indicate redirects, and
 857
   define relationships.
 858
 859
   The definitions of "URI-reference", "absolute-URI", "relative-part",
 860
   "scheme", "authority", "port", "host", "path-abempty", "segment",
 861
   "query", and "fragment" are adopted from the URI generic syntax.  An
 862
   "absolute-path" rule is defined for protocol elements that can
 863
   contain a non-empty path component.  (This rule differs slightly from
 864
   the path-abempty rule of RFC 3986, which allows for an empty path to
 865
   be used in references, and path-absolute rule, which does not allow
 866
   paths that begin with "//".)  A "partial-URI" rule is defined for
 867
   protocol elements that can contain a relative URI but not a fragment
 868
   component.
 869
 870
     URI-reference = <URI-reference, see [RFC3986], Section 4.1>
 871
     absolute-URI  = <absolute-URI, see [RFC3986], Section 4.3>
 872
     relative-part = <relative-part, see [RFC3986], Section 4.2>
 873
     scheme        = <scheme, see [RFC3986], Section 3.1>
 874
     authority     = <authority, see [RFC3986], Section 3.2>
 875
     uri-host      = <host, see [RFC3986], Section 3.2.2>
 876
     port          = <port, see [RFC3986], Section 3.2.3>
 877
     path-abempty  = <path-abempty, see [RFC3986], Section 3.3>
 878
     segment       = <segment, see [RFC3986], Section 3.3>
 879
     query         = <query, see [RFC3986], Section 3.4>
 880
     fragment      = <fragment, see [RFC3986], Section 3.5>
 881
 882
     absolute-path = 1*( "/" segment )
 883
     partial-URI   = relative-part [ "?" query ]
 884
 885
   Each protocol element in HTTP that allows a URI reference will
 886
   indicate in its ABNF production whether the element allows any form
 887
   of reference (URI-reference), only a URI in absolute form
 888
   (absolute-URI), only the path and optional query components, or some
 889
   combination of the above.  Unless otherwise indicated, URI references
 890
   are parsed relative to the effective request URI (Section 5.5).
 891
 892
 893
 894
 895
 896
 897
 898
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 16]
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RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
 901
 902
 903
2.7.1.  http URI Scheme
 904
 905
   The "http" URI scheme is hereby defined for the purpose of minting
 906
   identifiers according to their association with the hierarchical
 907
   namespace governed by a potential HTTP origin server listening for
 908
   TCP ([RFC0793]) connections on a given port.
 909
 910
     http-URI = "http:" "//" authority path-abempty [ "?" query ]
 911
                [ "#" fragment ]
 912
 913
   The origin server for an "http" URI is identified by the authority
 914
   component, which includes a host identifier and optional TCP port
 915
   ([RFC3986], Section 3.2.2).  The hierarchical path component and
 916
   optional query component serve as an identifier for a potential
 917
   target resource within that origin server's name space.  The optional
 918
   fragment component allows for indirect identification of a secondary
 919
   resource, independent of the URI scheme, as defined in Section 3.5 of
 920
   [RFC3986].
 921
 922
   A sender MUST NOT generate an "http" URI with an empty host
 923
   identifier.  A recipient that processes such a URI reference MUST
 924
   reject it as invalid.
 925
 926
   If the host identifier is provided as an IP address, the origin
 927
   server is the listener (if any) on the indicated TCP port at that IP
 928
   address.  If host is a registered name, the registered name is an
 929
   indirect identifier for use with a name resolution service, such as
 930
   DNS, to find an address for that origin server.  If the port
 931
   subcomponent is empty or not given, TCP port 80 (the reserved port
 932
   for WWW services) is the default.
 933
 934
   Note that the presence of a URI with a given authority component does
 935
   not imply that there is always an HTTP server listening for
 936
   connections on that host and port.  Anyone can mint a URI.  What the
 937
   authority component determines is who has the right to respond
 938
   authoritatively to requests that target the identified resource.  The
 939
   delegated nature of registered names and IP addresses creates a
 940
   federated namespace, based on control over the indicated host and
 941
   port, whether or not an HTTP server is present.  See Section 9.1 for
 942
   security considerations related to establishing authority.
 943
 944
   When an "http" URI is used within a context that calls for access to
 945
   the indicated resource, a client MAY attempt access by resolving the
 946
   host to an IP address, establishing a TCP connection to that address
 947
   on the indicated port, and sending an HTTP request message
 948
   (Section 3) containing the URI's identifying data (Section 5) to the
 949
   server.  If the server responds to that request with a non-interim
 950
 951
 952
 953
 954
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 17]
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RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
 957
 958
 959
   HTTP response message, as described in Section 6 of [RFC7231], then
 960
   that response is considered an authoritative answer to the client's
 961
   request.
 962
 963
   Although HTTP is independent of the transport protocol, the "http"
 964
   scheme is specific to TCP-based services because the name delegation
 965
   process depends on TCP for establishing authority.  An HTTP service
 966
   based on some other underlying connection protocol would presumably
 967
   be identified using a different URI scheme, just as the "https"
 968
   scheme (below) is used for resources that require an end-to-end
 969
   secured connection.  Other protocols might also be used to provide
 970
   access to "http" identified resources -- it is only the authoritative
 971
   interface that is specific to TCP.
 972
 973
   The URI generic syntax for authority also includes a deprecated
 974
   userinfo subcomponent ([RFC3986], Section 3.2.1) for including user
 975
   authentication information in the URI.  Some implementations make use
 976
   of the userinfo component for internal configuration of
 977
   authentication information, such as within command invocation
 978
   options, configuration files, or bookmark lists, even though such
 979
   usage might expose a user identifier or password.  A sender MUST NOT
 980
   generate the userinfo subcomponent (and its "@" delimiter) when an
 981
   "http" URI reference is generated within a message as a request
 982
   target or header field value.  Before making use of an "http" URI
 983
   reference received from an untrusted source, a recipient SHOULD parse
 984
   for userinfo and treat its presence as an error; it is likely being
 985
   used to obscure the authority for the sake of phishing attacks.
 986
 987
2.7.2.  https URI Scheme
 988
 989
   The "https" URI scheme is hereby defined for the purpose of minting
 990
   identifiers according to their association with the hierarchical
 991
   namespace governed by a potential HTTP origin server listening to a
 992
   given TCP port for TLS-secured connections ([RFC5246]).
 993
 994
   All of the requirements listed above for the "http" scheme are also
 995
   requirements for the "https" scheme, except that TCP port 443 is the
 996
   default if the port subcomponent is empty or not given, and the user
 997
   agent MUST ensure that its connection to the origin server is secured
 998
   through the use of strong encryption, end-to-end, prior to sending
 999
   the first HTTP request.
1000
1001
     https-URI = "https:" "//" authority path-abempty [ "?" query ]
1002
                 [ "#" fragment ]
1003
1004
   Note that the "https" URI scheme depends on both TLS and TCP for
1005
   establishing authority.  Resources made available via the "https"
1006
   scheme have no shared identity with the "http" scheme even if their
1007
1008
1009
1010
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 18]
1012
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1013
1014
1015
   resource identifiers indicate the same authority (the same host
1016
   listening to the same TCP port).  They are distinct namespaces and
1017
   are considered to be distinct origin servers.  However, an extension
1018
   to HTTP that is defined to apply to entire host domains, such as the
1019
   Cookie protocol [RFC6265], can allow information set by one service
1020
   to impact communication with other services within a matching group
1021
   of host domains.
1022
1023
   The process for authoritative access to an "https" identified
1024
   resource is defined in [RFC2818].
1025
1026
2.7.3.  http and https URI Normalization and Comparison
1027
1028
   Since the "http" and "https" schemes conform to the URI generic
1029
   syntax, such URIs are normalized and compared according to the
1030
   algorithm defined in Section 6 of [RFC3986], using the defaults
1031
   described above for each scheme.
1032
1033
   If the port is equal to the default port for a scheme, the normal
1034
   form is to omit the port subcomponent.  When not being used in
1035
   absolute form as the request target of an OPTIONS request, an empty
1036
   path component is equivalent to an absolute path of "/", so the
1037
   normal form is to provide a path of "/" instead.  The scheme and host
.../cache/cache.h 688
1038
   are case-insensitive and normally provided in lowercase; all other
1039
   components are compared in a case-sensitive manner.  Characters other
1040
   than those in the "reserved" set are equivalent to their
1041
   percent-encoded octets: the normal form is to not encode them (see
1042
   Sections 2.1 and 2.2 of [RFC3986]).
1043
1044
   For example, the following three URIs are equivalent:
1045
1046
      http://example.com:80/~smith/home.html
1047
      http://EXAMPLE.com/%7Esmith/home.html
1048
      http://EXAMPLE.com:/%7esmith/home.html
1049
1050
3.  Message Format
1051
1052
   All HTTP/1.1 messages consist of a start-line followed by a sequence
1053
   of octets in a format similar to the Internet Message Format
1054
   [RFC5322]: zero or more header fields (collectively referred to as
1055
   the "headers" or the "header section"), an empty line indicating the
1056
   end of the header section, and an optional message body.
1057
1058
     HTTP-message   = start-line
1059
                      *( header-field CRLF )
1060
                      CRLF
1061
                      [ message-body ]
1062
1063
1064
1065
1066
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 19]
1068
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
1069
1070
1071
   The normal procedure for parsing an HTTP message is to read the
1072
   start-line into a structure, read each header field into a hash table
1073
   by field name until the empty line, and then use the parsed data to
1074
   determine if a message body is expected.  If a message body has been
1075
   indicated, then it is read as a stream until an amount of octets
1076
   equal to the message body length is read or the connection is closed.
1077
1078
   A recipient MUST parse an HTTP message as a sequence of octets in an
1079
   encoding that is a superset of US-ASCII [USASCII].  Parsing an HTTP
1080
   message as a stream of Unicode characters, without regard for the
1081
   specific encoding, creates security vulnerabilities due to the
1082
   varying ways that string processing libraries handle invalid
1083
   multibyte character sequences that contain the octet LF (%x0A).
1084
   String-based parsers can only be safely used within protocol elements
1085
   after the element has been extracted from the message, such as within
1086
   a header field-value after message parsing has delineated the
1087
   individual fields.
1088
1089
   An HTTP message can be parsed as a stream for incremental processing
1090
   or forwarding downstream.  However, recipients cannot rely on
1091
   incremental delivery of partial messages, since some implementations
1092
   will buffer or delay message forwarding for the sake of network
1093
   efficiency, security checks, or payload transformations.
1094
1095
   A sender MUST NOT send whitespace between the start-line and the
1096
   first header field.  A recipient that receives whitespace between the
1097
   start-line and the first header field MUST either reject the message
1098
   as invalid or consume each whitespace-preceded line without further
1099
   processing of it (i.e., ignore the entire line, along with any
1100
   subsequent lines preceded by whitespace, until a properly formed
1101
   header field is received or the header section is terminated).
1102
1103
   The presence of such whitespace in a request might be an attempt to
1104
   trick a server into ignoring that field or processing the line after
1105
   it as a new request, either of which might result in a security
1106
   vulnerability if other implementations within the request chain
1107
   interpret the same message differently.  Likewise, the presence of
1108
   such whitespace in a response might be ignored by some clients or
1109
   cause others to cease parsing.
1110
1111
3.1.  Start Line
1112
1113
   An HTTP message can be either a request from client to server or a
1114
   response from server to client.  Syntactically, the two types of
1115
   message differ only in the start-line, which is either a request-line
1116
   (for requests) or a status-line (for responses), and in the algorithm
1117
   for determining the length of the message body (Section 3.3).
1118
1119
1120
1121
1122
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1125
1126
1127
   In theory, a client could receive requests and a server could receive
1128
   responses, distinguishing them by their different start-line formats,
1129
   but, in practice, servers are implemented to only expect a request (a
1130
   response is interpreted as an unknown or invalid request method) and
1131
   clients are implemented to only expect a response.
1132
1133
     start-line     = request-line / status-line
1134
1135
3.1.1.  Request Line
1136
1137
   A request-line begins with a method token, followed by a single space
1138
   (SP), the request-target, another single space (SP), the protocol
1139
   version, and ends with CRLF.
1140
1141
     request-line   = method SP request-target SP HTTP-version CRLF
1142
1143
   The method token indicates the request method to be performed on the
1144
   target resource.  The request method is case-sensitive.
.../cache/cache.h 691
1145
1146
     method         = token
1147
1148
   The request methods defined by this specification can be found in
1149
   Section 4 of [RFC7231], along with information regarding the HTTP
1150
   method registry and considerations for defining new methods.
1151
1152
   The request-target identifies the target resource upon which to apply
1153
   the request, as defined in Section 5.3.
1154
1155
   Recipients typically parse the request-line into its component parts
1156
   by splitting on whitespace (see Section 3.5), since no whitespace is
1157
   allowed in the three components.  Unfortunately, some user agents
1158
   fail to properly encode or exclude whitespace found in hypertext
1159
   references, resulting in those disallowed characters being sent in a
1160
   request-target.
1161
1162
   Recipients of an invalid request-line SHOULD respond with either a
1163
   400 (Bad Request) error or a 301 (Moved Permanently) redirect with
1164
   the request-target properly encoded.  A recipient SHOULD NOT attempt
1165
   to autocorrect and then process the request without a redirect, since
1166
   the invalid request-line might be deliberately crafted to bypass
1167
   security filters along the request chain.
1168
1169
   HTTP does not place a predefined limit on the length of a
1170
   request-line, as described in Section 2.5.  A server that receives a
1171
   method longer than any that it implements SHOULD respond with a 501
1172
   (Not Implemented) status code.  A server that receives a
1173
1174
1175
1176
1177
1178
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 21]
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1181
1182
1183
   request-target longer than any URI it wishes to parse MUST respond
1184
   with a 414 (URI Too Long) status code (see Section 6.5.12 of
1185
   [RFC7231]).
1186
1187
   Various ad hoc limitations on request-line length are found in
1188
   practice.  It is RECOMMENDED that all HTTP senders and recipients
1189
   support, at a minimum, request-line lengths of 8000 octets.
1190
1191
3.1.2.  Status Line
1192
1193
   The first line of a response message is the status-line, consisting
1194
   of the protocol version, a space (SP), the status code, another
1195
   space, a possibly empty textual phrase describing the status code,
1196
   and ending with CRLF.
1197
1198
     status-line = HTTP-version SP status-code SP reason-phrase CRLF
1199
1200
   The status-code element is a 3-digit integer code describing the
1201
   result of the server's attempt to understand and satisfy the client's
1202
   corresponding request.  The rest of the response message is to be
1203
   interpreted in light of the semantics defined for that status code.
1204
   See Section 6 of [RFC7231] for information about the semantics of
1205
   status codes, including the classes of status code (indicated by the
1206
   first digit), the status codes defined by this specification,
1207
   considerations for the definition of new status codes, and the IANA
1208
   registry.
1209
1210
     status-code    = 3DIGIT
1211
1212
   The reason-phrase element exists for the sole purpose of providing a
1213
   textual description associated with the numeric status code, mostly
1214
   out of deference to earlier Internet application protocols that were
1215
   more frequently used with interactive text clients.  A client SHOULD
1216
   ignore the reason-phrase content.
1217
1218
     reason-phrase  = *( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
1219
1220
3.2.  Header Fields
1221
1222
   Each header field consists of a case-insensitive field name followed
.../cache/cache.h 695
1223
   by a colon (":"), optional leading whitespace, the field value, and
1224
   optional trailing whitespace.
1225
1226
1227
1228
1229
1230
1231
1232
1233
1234
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 22]
1236
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1237
1238
1239
     header-field   = field-name ":" OWS field-value OWS
1240
1241
     field-name     = token
1242
     field-value    = *( field-content / obs-fold )
1243
     field-content  = field-vchar [ 1*( SP / HTAB ) field-vchar ]
.../cache/cache_vrt.c 542
1244
     field-vchar    = VCHAR / obs-text
1245
1246
     obs-fold       = CRLF 1*( SP / HTAB )
1247
                    ; obsolete line folding
1248
                    ; see Section 3.2.4
1249
1250
   The field-name token labels the corresponding field-value as having
1251
   the semantics defined by that header field.  For example, the Date
1252
   header field is defined in Section 7.1.1.2 of [RFC7231] as containing
1253
   the origination timestamp for the message in which it appears.
1254
1255
3.2.1.  Field Extensibility
1256
1257
   Header fields are fully extensible: there is no limit on the
1258
   introduction of new field names, each presumably defining new
1259
   semantics, nor on the number of header fields used in a given
1260
   message.  Existing fields are defined in each part of this
1261
   specification and in many other specifications outside this document
1262
   set.
1263
1264
   New header fields can be defined such that, when they are understood
1265
   by a recipient, they might override or enhance the interpretation of
1266
   previously defined header fields, define preconditions on request
1267
   evaluation, or refine the meaning of responses.
1268
1269
   A proxy MUST forward unrecognized header fields unless the field-name
1270
   is listed in the Connection header field (Section 6.1) or the proxy
1271
   is specifically configured to block, or otherwise transform, such
1272
   fields.  Other recipients SHOULD ignore unrecognized header fields.
1273
   These requirements allow HTTP's functionality to be enhanced without
1274
   requiring prior update of deployed intermediaries.
1275
1276
   All defined header fields ought to be registered with IANA in the
1277
   "Message Headers" registry, as described in Section 8.3 of [RFC7231].
1278
1279
3.2.2.  Field Order
1280
1281
   The order in which header fields with differing field names are
1282
   received is not significant.  However, it is good practice to send
1283
   header fields that contain control data first, such as Host on
1284
   requests and Date on responses, so that implementations can decide
1285
   when not to handle a message as early as possible.  A server MUST NOT
1286
   apply a request to the target resource until the entire request
1287
1288
1289
1290
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 23]
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1293
1294
1295
   header section is received, since later header fields might include
1296
   conditionals, authentication credentials, or deliberately misleading
1297
   duplicate header fields that would impact request processing.
1298
1299
   A sender MUST NOT generate multiple header fields with the same field
1300
   name in a message unless either the entire field value for that
1301
   header field is defined as a comma-separated list [i.e., #(values)]
1302
   or the header field is a well-known exception (as noted below).
1303
1304
   A recipient MAY combine multiple header fields with the same field
1305
   name into one "field-name: field-value" pair, without changing the
1306
   semantics of the message, by appending each subsequent field value to
1307
   the combined field value in order, separated by a comma.  The order
1308
   in which header fields with the same field name are received is
1309
   therefore significant to the interpretation of the combined field
1310
   value; a proxy MUST NOT change the order of these field values when
1311
   forwarding a message.
1312
1313
      Note: In practice, the "Set-Cookie" header field ([RFC6265]) often
1314
      appears multiple times in a response message and does not use the
1315
      list syntax, violating the above requirements on multiple header
1316
      fields with the same name.  Since it cannot be combined into a
1317
      single field-value, recipients ought to handle "Set-Cookie" as a
1318
      special case while processing header fields.  (See Appendix A.2.3
1319
      of [Kri2001] for details.)
1320
1321
3.2.3.  Whitespace
1322
1323
   This specification uses three rules to denote the use of linear
1324
   whitespace: OWS (optional whitespace), RWS (required whitespace), and
1325
   BWS ("bad" whitespace).
1326
1327
   The OWS rule is used where zero or more linear whitespace octets
1328
   might appear.  For protocol elements where optional whitespace is
1329
   preferred to improve readability, a sender SHOULD generate the
1330
   optional whitespace as a single SP; otherwise, a sender SHOULD NOT
1331
   generate optional whitespace except as needed to white out invalid or
1332
   unwanted protocol elements during in-place message filtering.
1333
1334
   The RWS rule is used when at least one linear whitespace octet is
1335
   required to separate field tokens.  A sender SHOULD generate RWS as a
1336
   single SP.
1337
1338
   The BWS rule is used where the grammar allows optional whitespace
1339
   only for historical reasons.  A sender MUST NOT generate BWS in
1340
   messages.  A recipient MUST parse for such bad whitespace and remove
1341
   it before interpreting the protocol element.
1342
1343
1344
1345
1346
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 24]
1348
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
1349
1350
1351
     OWS            = *( SP / HTAB )
1352
                    ; optional whitespace
1353
     RWS            = 1*( SP / HTAB )
1354
                    ; required whitespace
1355
     BWS            = OWS
1356
                    ; "bad" whitespace
1357
1358
3.2.4.  Field Parsing
1359
1360
   Messages are parsed using a generic algorithm, independent of the
1361
   individual header field names.  The contents within a given field
1362
   value are not parsed until a later stage of message interpretation
1363
   (usually after the message's entire header section has been
1364
   processed).  Consequently, this specification does not use ABNF rules
1365
   to define each "Field-Name: Field Value" pair, as was done in
1366
   previous editions.  Instead, this specification uses ABNF rules that
1367
   are named according to each registered field name, wherein the rule
1368
   defines the valid grammar for that field's corresponding field values
1369
   (i.e., after the field-value has been extracted from the header
1370
   section by a generic field parser).
1371
1372
   No whitespace is allowed between the header field-name and colon.  In
1373
   the past, differences in the handling of such whitespace have led to
1374
   security vulnerabilities in request routing and response handling.  A
1375
   server MUST reject any received request message that contains
1376
   whitespace between a header field-name and colon with a response code
1377
   of 400 (Bad Request).  A proxy MUST remove any such whitespace from a
1378
   response message before forwarding the message downstream.
1379
1380
   A field value might be preceded and/or followed by optional
1381
   whitespace (OWS); a single SP preceding the field-value is preferred
1382
   for consistent readability by humans.  The field value does not
1383
   include any leading or trailing whitespace: OWS occurring before the
1384
   first non-whitespace octet of the field value or after the last
1385
   non-whitespace octet of the field value ought to be excluded by
1386
   parsers when extracting the field value from a header field.
1387
1388
   Historically, HTTP header field values could be extended over
1389
   multiple lines by preceding each extra line with at least one space
1390
   or horizontal tab (obs-fold).  This specification deprecates such
1391
   line folding except within the message/http media type
1392
   (Section 8.3.1).  A sender MUST NOT generate a message that includes
1393
   line folding (i.e., that has any field-value that contains a match to
1394
   the obs-fold rule) unless the message is intended for packaging
1395
   within the message/http media type.
1396
1397
1398
1399
1400
1401
1402
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 25]
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1405
1406
1407
   A server that receives an obs-fold in a request message that is not
1408
   within a message/http container MUST either reject the message by
1409
   sending a 400 (Bad Request), preferably with a representation
1410
   explaining that obsolete line folding is unacceptable, or replace
1411
   each received obs-fold with one or more SP octets prior to
1412
   interpreting the field value or forwarding the message downstream.
1413
1414
   A proxy or gateway that receives an obs-fold in a response message
1415
   that is not within a message/http container MUST either discard the
1416
   message and replace it with a 502 (Bad Gateway) response, preferably
1417
   with a representation explaining that unacceptable line folding was
1418
   received, or replace each received obs-fold with one or more SP
1419
   octets prior to interpreting the field value or forwarding the
1420
   message downstream.
1421
1422
   A user agent that receives an obs-fold in a response message that is
1423
   not within a message/http container MUST replace each received
1424
   obs-fold with one or more SP octets prior to interpreting the field
1425
   value.
1426
1427
   Historically, HTTP has allowed field content with text in the
1428
   ISO-8859-1 charset [ISO-8859-1], supporting other charsets only
1429
   through use of [RFC2047] encoding.  In practice, most HTTP header
1430
   field values use only a subset of the US-ASCII charset [USASCII].
1431
   Newly defined header fields SHOULD limit their field values to
1432
   US-ASCII octets.  A recipient SHOULD treat other octets in field
1433
   content (obs-text) as opaque data.
1434
1435
3.2.5.  Field Limits
1436
1437
   HTTP does not place a predefined limit on the length of each header
1438
   field or on the length of the header section as a whole, as described
1439
   in Section 2.5.  Various ad hoc limitations on individual header
1440
   field length are found in practice, often depending on the specific
1441
   field semantics.
1442
1443
   A server that receives a request header field, or set of fields,
1444
   larger than it wishes to process MUST respond with an appropriate 4xx
1445
   (Client Error) status code.  Ignoring such header fields would
1446
   increase the server's vulnerability to request smuggling attacks
1447
   (Section 9.5).
1448
1449
   A client MAY discard or truncate received header fields that are
1450
   larger than the client wishes to process if the field semantics are
1451
   such that the dropped value(s) can be safely ignored without changing
1452
   the message framing or response semantics.
1453
1454
1455
1456
1457
1458
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 26]
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1461
1462
1463
3.2.6.  Field Value Components
1464
1465
   Most HTTP header field values are defined using common syntax
1466
   components (token, quoted-string, and comment) separated by
1467
   whitespace or specific delimiting characters.  Delimiters are chosen
1468
   from the set of US-ASCII visual characters not allowed in a token
1469
   (DQUOTE and "(),/:;<=>?@[\]{}").
1470
1471
     token          = 1*tchar
1472
1473
     tchar          = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "*"
1474
                    / "+" / "-" / "." / "^" / "_" / "`" / "|" / "~"
1475
                    / DIGIT / ALPHA
1476
                    ; any VCHAR, except delimiters
1477
1478
   A string of text is parsed as a single value if it is quoted using
1479
   double-quote marks.
1480
1481
     quoted-string  = DQUOTE *( qdtext / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE
1482
     qdtext         = HTAB / SP /%x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E / obs-text
1483
     obs-text       = %x80-FF
1484
1485
   Comments can be included in some HTTP header fields by surrounding
1486
   the comment text with parentheses.  Comments are only allowed in
1487
   fields containing "comment" as part of their field value definition.
1488
1489
     comment        = "(" *( ctext / quoted-pair / comment ) ")"
1490
     ctext          = HTAB / SP / %x21-27 / %x2A-5B / %x5D-7E / obs-text
1491
1492
   The backslash octet ("\") can be used as a single-octet quoting
1493
   mechanism within quoted-string and comment constructs.  Recipients
1494
   that process the value of a quoted-string MUST handle a quoted-pair
1495
   as if it were replaced by the octet following the backslash.
1496
1497
     quoted-pair    = "\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
1498
1499
   A sender SHOULD NOT generate a quoted-pair in a quoted-string except
1500
   where necessary to quote DQUOTE and backslash octets occurring within
1501
   that string.  A sender SHOULD NOT generate a quoted-pair in a comment
1502
   except where necessary to quote parentheses ["(" and ")"] and
1503
   backslash octets occurring within that comment.
1504
1505
1506
1507
1508
1509
1510
1511
1512
1513
1514
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 27]
1516
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
1517
1518
1519
3.3.  Message Body
1520
1521
   The message body (if any) of an HTTP message is used to carry the
1522
   payload body of that request or response.  The message body is
1523
   identical to the payload body unless a transfer coding has been
1524
   applied, as described in Section 3.3.1.
1525
1526
     message-body = *OCTET
1527
1528
   The rules for when a message body is allowed in a message differ for
1529
   requests and responses.
1530
1531
   The presence of a message body in a request is signaled by a
1532
   Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding header field.  Request message
1533
   framing is independent of method semantics, even if the method does
1534
   not define any use for a message body.
1535
1536
   The presence of a message body in a response depends on both the
1537
   request method to which it is responding and the response status code
1538
   (Section 3.1.2).  Responses to the HEAD request method (Section 4.3.2
1539
   of [RFC7231]) never include a message body because the associated
1540
   response header fields (e.g., Transfer-Encoding, Content-Length,
1541
   etc.), if present, indicate only what their values would have been if
1542
   the request method had been GET (Section 4.3.1 of [RFC7231]). 2xx
1543
   (Successful) responses to a CONNECT request method (Section 4.3.6 of
1544
   [RFC7231]) switch to tunnel mode instead of having a message body.
1545
   All 1xx (Informational), 204 (No Content), and 304 (Not Modified)
1546
   responses do not include a message body.  All other responses do
1547
   include a message body, although the body might be of zero length.
1548
1549
3.3.1.  Transfer-Encoding
1550
1551
   The Transfer-Encoding header field lists the transfer coding names
1552
   corresponding to the sequence of transfer codings that have been (or
1553
   will be) applied to the payload body in order to form the message
1554
   body.  Transfer codings are defined in Section 4.
1555
1556
     Transfer-Encoding = 1#transfer-coding
1557
1558
   Transfer-Encoding is analogous to the Content-Transfer-Encoding field
1559
   of MIME, which was designed to enable safe transport of binary data
1560
   over a 7-bit transport service ([RFC2045], Section 6).  However, safe
1561
   transport has a different focus for an 8bit-clean transfer protocol.
1562
   In HTTP's case, Transfer-Encoding is primarily intended to accurately
1563
   delimit a dynamically generated payload and to distinguish payload
1564
   encodings that are only applied for transport efficiency or security
1565
   from those that are characteristics of the selected resource.
1566
1567
1568
1569
1570
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 28]
1572
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
1573
1574
1575
   A recipient MUST be able to parse the chunked transfer coding
1576
   (Section 4.1) because it plays a crucial role in framing messages
1577
   when the payload body size is not known in advance.  A sender MUST
1578
   NOT apply chunked more than once to a message body (i.e., chunking an
1579
   already chunked message is not allowed).  If any transfer coding
1580
   other than chunked is applied to a request payload body, the sender
1581
   MUST apply chunked as the final transfer coding to ensure that the
1582
   message is properly framed.  If any transfer coding other than
1583
   chunked is applied to a response payload body, the sender MUST either
1584
   apply chunked as the final transfer coding or terminate the message
1585
   by closing the connection.
1586
1587
   For example,
1588
1589
     Transfer-Encoding: gzip, chunked
1590
1591
   indicates that the payload body has been compressed using the gzip
1592
   coding and then chunked using the chunked coding while forming the
1593
   message body.
1594
1595
   Unlike Content-Encoding (Section 3.1.2.1 of [RFC7231]),
1596
   Transfer-Encoding is a property of the message, not of the
1597
   representation, and any recipient along the request/response chain
1598
   MAY decode the received transfer coding(s) or apply additional
1599
   transfer coding(s) to the message body, assuming that corresponding
1600
   changes are made to the Transfer-Encoding field-value.  Additional
1601
   information about the encoding parameters can be provided by other
1602
   header fields not defined by this specification.
1603
1604
   Transfer-Encoding MAY be sent in a response to a HEAD request or in a
1605
   304 (Not Modified) response (Section 4.1 of [RFC7232]) to a GET
1606
   request, neither of which includes a message body, to indicate that
1607
   the origin server would have applied a transfer coding to the message
1608
   body if the request had been an unconditional GET.  This indication
1609
   is not required, however, because any recipient on the response chain
1610
   (including the origin server) can remove transfer codings when they
1611
   are not needed.
1612
1613
   A server MUST NOT send a Transfer-Encoding header field in any
1614
   response with a status code of 1xx (Informational) or 204 (No
1615
   Content).  A server MUST NOT send a Transfer-Encoding header field in
1616
   any 2xx (Successful) response to a CONNECT request (Section 4.3.6 of
1617
   [RFC7231]).
1618
1619
   Transfer-Encoding was added in HTTP/1.1.  It is generally assumed
1620
   that implementations advertising only HTTP/1.0 support will not
1621
   understand how to process a transfer-encoded payload.  A client MUST
1622
   NOT send a request containing Transfer-Encoding unless it knows the
1623
1624
1625
1626
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 29]
1628
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
1629
1630
1631
   server will handle HTTP/1.1 (or later) requests; such knowledge might
1632
   be in the form of specific user configuration or by remembering the
1633
   version of a prior received response.  A server MUST NOT send a
1634
   response containing Transfer-Encoding unless the corresponding
1635
   request indicates HTTP/1.1 (or later).
1636
1637
   A server that receives a request message with a transfer coding it
1638
   does not understand SHOULD respond with 501 (Not Implemented).
1639
1640
3.3.2.  Content-Length
1641
1642
   When a message does not have a Transfer-Encoding header field, a
1643
   Content-Length header field can provide the anticipated size, as a
1644
   decimal number of octets, for a potential payload body.  For messages
1645
   that do include a payload body, the Content-Length field-value
1646
   provides the framing information necessary for determining where the
1647
   body (and message) ends.  For messages that do not include a payload
1648
   body, the Content-Length indicates the size of the selected
1649
   representation (Section 3 of [RFC7231]).
1650
1651
     Content-Length = 1*DIGIT
1652
1653
   An example is
1654
1655
     Content-Length: 3495
1656
1657
   A sender MUST NOT send a Content-Length header field in any message
1658
   that contains a Transfer-Encoding header field.
1659
1660
   A user agent SHOULD send a Content-Length in a request message when
1661
   no Transfer-Encoding is sent and the request method defines a meaning
1662
   for an enclosed payload body.  For example, a Content-Length header
1663
   field is normally sent in a POST request even when the value is 0
1664
   (indicating an empty payload body).  A user agent SHOULD NOT send a
1665
   Content-Length header field when the request message does not contain
1666
   a payload body and the method semantics do not anticipate such a
1667
   body.
1668
1669
   A server MAY send a Content-Length header field in a response to a
1670
   HEAD request (Section 4.3.2 of [RFC7231]); a server MUST NOT send
1671
   Content-Length in such a response unless its field-value equals the
1672
   decimal number of octets that would have been sent in the payload
1673
   body of a response if the same request had used the GET method.
1674
1675
   A server MAY send a Content-Length header field in a 304 (Not
.../cache/cache_req_fsm.c 477
1676
   Modified) response to a conditional GET request (Section 4.1 of
1677
   [RFC7232]); a server MUST NOT send Content-Length in such a response
1678
1679
1680
1681
1682
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 30]
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1685
1686
1687
   unless its field-value equals the decimal number of octets that would
1688
   have been sent in the payload body of a 200 (OK) response to the same
1689
   request.
1690
1691
   A server MUST NOT send a Content-Length header field in any response
.../cache/cache_req_fsm.c 474
1692
   with a status code of 1xx (Informational) or 204 (No Content).  A
1693
   server MUST NOT send a Content-Length header field in any 2xx
1694
   (Successful) response to a CONNECT request (Section 4.3.6 of
1695
   [RFC7231]).
1696
1697
   Aside from the cases defined above, in the absence of
1698
   Transfer-Encoding, an origin server SHOULD send a Content-Length
1699
   header field when the payload body size is known prior to sending the
1700
   complete header section.  This will allow downstream recipients to
1701
   measure transfer progress, know when a received message is complete,
1702
   and potentially reuse the connection for additional requests.
1703
1704
   Any Content-Length field value greater than or equal to zero is
1705
   valid.  Since there is no predefined limit to the length of a
1706
   payload, a recipient MUST anticipate potentially large decimal
1707
   numerals and prevent parsing errors due to integer conversion
1708
   overflows (Section 9.3).
1709
1710
   If a message is received that has multiple Content-Length header
1711
   fields with field-values consisting of the same decimal value, or a
1712
   single Content-Length header field with a field value containing a
1713
   list of identical decimal values (e.g., "Content-Length: 42, 42"),
1714
   indicating that duplicate Content-Length header fields have been
1715
   generated or combined by an upstream message processor, then the
1716
   recipient MUST either reject the message as invalid or replace the
1717
   duplicated field-values with a single valid Content-Length field
1718
   containing that decimal value prior to determining the message body
1719
   length or forwarding the message.
1720
1721
      Note: HTTP's use of Content-Length for message framing differs
1722
      significantly from the same field's use in MIME, where it is an
1723
      optional field used only within the "message/external-body"
1724
      media-type.
1725
1726
1727
1728
1729
1730
1731
1732
1733
1734
1735
1736
1737
1738
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 31]
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1741
1742
1743
3.3.3.  Message Body Length
1744
1745
   The length of a message body is determined by one of the following
1746
   (in order of precedence):
1747
1748
   1.  Any response to a HEAD request and any response with a 1xx
.../cache/cache_req_fsm.c 457
1749
       (Informational), 204 (No Content), or 304 (Not Modified) status
1750
       code is always terminated by the first empty line after the
1751
       header fields, regardless of the header fields present in the
1752
       message, and thus cannot contain a message body.
1753
1754
   2.  Any 2xx (Successful) response to a CONNECT request implies that
1755
       the connection will become a tunnel immediately after the empty
1756
       line that concludes the header fields.  A client MUST ignore any
1757
       Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding header fields received in
1758
       such a message.
1759
1760
   3.  If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present and the chunked
1761
       transfer coding (Section 4.1) is the final encoding, the message
1762
       body length is determined by reading and decoding the chunked
1763
       data until the transfer coding indicates the data is complete.
1764
1765
       If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a response and
1766
       the chunked transfer coding is not the final encoding, the
1767
       message body length is determined by reading the connection until
1768
       it is closed by the server.  If a Transfer-Encoding header field
1769
       is present in a request and the chunked transfer coding is not
1770
       the final encoding, the message body length cannot be determined
1771
       reliably; the server MUST respond with the 400 (Bad Request)
1772
       status code and then close the connection.
1773
1774
       If a message is received with both a Transfer-Encoding and a
1775
       Content-Length header field, the Transfer-Encoding overrides the
1776
       Content-Length.  Such a message might indicate an attempt to
1777
       perform request smuggling (Section 9.5) or response splitting
1778
       (Section 9.4) and ought to be handled as an error.  A sender MUST
1779
       remove the received Content-Length field prior to forwarding such
1780
       a message downstream.
1781
1782
   4.  If a message is received without Transfer-Encoding and with
1783
       either multiple Content-Length header fields having differing
1784
       field-values or a single Content-Length header field having an
1785
       invalid value, then the message framing is invalid and the
1786
       recipient MUST treat it as an unrecoverable error.  If this is a
1787
       request message, the server MUST respond with a 400 (Bad Request)
1788
       status code and then close the connection.  If this is a response
1789
       message received by a proxy, the proxy MUST close the connection
1790
       to the server, discard the received response, and send a 502 (Bad
1791
1792
1793
1794
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 32]
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1797
1798
1799
       Gateway) response to the client.  If this is a response message
1800
       received by a user agent, the user agent MUST close the
1801
       connection to the server and discard the received response.
1802
1803
   5.  If a valid Content-Length header field is present without
1804
       Transfer-Encoding, its decimal value defines the expected message
1805
       body length in octets.  If the sender closes the connection or
1806
       the recipient times out before the indicated number of octets are
1807
       received, the recipient MUST consider the message to be
1808
       incomplete and close the connection.
1809
1810
   6.  If this is a request message and none of the above are true, then
1811
       the message body length is zero (no message body is present).
1812
1813
   7.  Otherwise, this is a response message without a declared message
1814
       body length, so the message body length is determined by the
1815
       number of octets received prior to the server closing the
1816
       connection.
1817
1818
   Since there is no way to distinguish a successfully completed,
1819
   close-delimited message from a partially received message interrupted
1820
   by network failure, a server SHOULD generate encoding or
1821
   length-delimited messages whenever possible.  The close-delimiting
1822
   feature exists primarily for backwards compatibility with HTTP/1.0.
1823
1824
   A server MAY reject a request that contains a message body but not a
1825
   Content-Length by responding with 411 (Length Required).
1826
1827
   Unless a transfer coding other than chunked has been applied, a
1828
   client that sends a request containing a message body SHOULD use a
1829
   valid Content-Length header field if the message body length is known
1830
   in advance, rather than the chunked transfer coding, since some
1831
   existing services respond to chunked with a 411 (Length Required)
1832
   status code even though they understand the chunked transfer coding.
1833
   This is typically because such services are implemented via a gateway
1834
   that requires a content-length in advance of being called and the
1835
   server is unable or unwilling to buffer the entire request before
1836
   processing.
1837
1838
   A user agent that sends a request containing a message body MUST send
1839
   a valid Content-Length header field if it does not know the server
1840
   will handle HTTP/1.1 (or later) requests; such knowledge can be in
1841
   the form of specific user configuration or by remembering the version
1842
   of a prior received response.
1843
1844
   If the final response to the last request on a connection has been
1845
   completely received and there remains additional data to read, a user
1846
   agent MAY discard the remaining data or attempt to determine if that
1847
1848
1849
1850
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 33]
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1853
1854
1855
   data belongs as part of the prior response body, which might be the
1856
   case if the prior message's Content-Length value is incorrect.  A
1857
   client MUST NOT process, cache, or forward such extra data as a
1858
   separate response, since such behavior would be vulnerable to cache
1859
   poisoning.
1860
1861
3.4.  Handling Incomplete Messages
1862
1863
   A server that receives an incomplete request message, usually due to
1864
   a canceled request or a triggered timeout exception, MAY send an
1865
   error response prior to closing the connection.
1866
1867
   A client that receives an incomplete response message, which can
1868
   occur when a connection is closed prematurely or when decoding a
1869
   supposedly chunked transfer coding fails, MUST record the message as
1870
   incomplete.  Cache requirements for incomplete responses are defined
1871
   in Section 3 of [RFC7234].
1872
1873
   If a response terminates in the middle of the header section (before
1874
   the empty line is received) and the status code might rely on header
1875
   fields to convey the full meaning of the response, then the client
1876
   cannot assume that meaning has been conveyed; the client might need
1877
   to repeat the request in order to determine what action to take next.
1878
1879
   A message body that uses the chunked transfer coding is incomplete if
1880
   the zero-sized chunk that terminates the encoding has not been
1881
   received.  A message that uses a valid Content-Length is incomplete
1882
   if the size of the message body received (in octets) is less than the
1883
   value given by Content-Length.  A response that has neither chunked
1884
   transfer coding nor Content-Length is terminated by closure of the
1885
   connection and, thus, is considered complete regardless of the number
1886
   of message body octets received, provided that the header section was
1887
   received intact.
1888
1889
3.5.  Message Parsing Robustness
1890
1891
   Older HTTP/1.0 user agent implementations might send an extra CRLF
1892
   after a POST request as a workaround for some early server
1893
   applications that failed to read message body content that was not
1894
   terminated by a line-ending.  An HTTP/1.1 user agent MUST NOT preface
1895
   or follow a request with an extra CRLF.  If terminating the request
1896
   message body with a line-ending is desired, then the user agent MUST
1897
   count the terminating CRLF octets as part of the message body length.
1898
1899
   In the interest of robustness, a server that is expecting to receive
1900
   and parse a request-line SHOULD ignore at least one empty line (CRLF)
1901
   received prior to the request-line.
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 34]
1908
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
1909
1910
1911
   Although the line terminator for the start-line and header fields is
1912
   the sequence CRLF, a recipient MAY recognize a single LF as a line
1913
   terminator and ignore any preceding CR.
1914
1915
   Although the request-line and status-line grammar rules require that
1916
   each of the component elements be separated by a single SP octet,
1917
   recipients MAY instead parse on whitespace-delimited word boundaries
1918
   and, aside from the CRLF terminator, treat any form of whitespace as
1919
   the SP separator while ignoring preceding or trailing whitespace;
1920
   such whitespace includes one or more of the following octets: SP,
1921
   HTAB, VT (%x0B), FF (%x0C), or bare CR.  However, lenient parsing can
1922
   result in security vulnerabilities if there are multiple recipients
1923
   of the message and each has its own unique interpretation of
1924
   robustness (see Section 9.5).
1925
1926
   When a server listening only for HTTP request messages, or processing
1927
   what appears from the start-line to be an HTTP request message,
1928
   receives a sequence of octets that does not match the HTTP-message
1929
   grammar aside from the robustness exceptions listed above, the server
1930
   SHOULD respond with a 400 (Bad Request) response.
1931
1932
4.  Transfer Codings
1933
1934
   Transfer coding names are used to indicate an encoding transformation
1935
   that has been, can be, or might need to be applied to a payload body
1936
   in order to ensure "safe transport" through the network.  This
1937
   differs from a content coding in that the transfer coding is a
1938
   property of the message rather than a property of the representation
1939
   that is being transferred.
1940
1941
     transfer-coding    = "chunked" ; Section 4.1
1942
                        / "compress" ; Section 4.2.1
1943
                        / "deflate" ; Section 4.2.2
1944
                        / "gzip" ; Section 4.2.3
1945
                        / transfer-extension
1946
     transfer-extension = token *( OWS ";" OWS transfer-parameter )
1947
1948
   Parameters are in the form of a name or name=value pair.
1949
1950
     transfer-parameter = token BWS "=" BWS ( token / quoted-string )
1951
1952
   All transfer-coding names are case-insensitive and ought to be
.../cache/cache.h 703
1953
   registered within the HTTP Transfer Coding registry, as defined in
1954
   Section 8.4.  They are used in the TE (Section 4.3) and
1955
   Transfer-Encoding (Section 3.3.1) header fields.
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 35]
1964
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
1965
1966
1967
4.1.  Chunked Transfer Coding
1968
1969
   The chunked transfer coding wraps the payload body in order to
1970
   transfer it as a series of chunks, each with its own size indicator,
1971
   followed by an OPTIONAL trailer containing header fields.  Chunked
1972
   enables content streams of unknown size to be transferred as a
1973
   sequence of length-delimited buffers, which enables the sender to
1974
   retain connection persistence and the recipient to know when it has
1975
   received the entire message.
1976
1977
     chunked-body   = *chunk
1978
                      last-chunk
1979
                      trailer-part
1980
                      CRLF
1981
1982
     chunk          = chunk-size [ chunk-ext ] CRLF
1983
                      chunk-data CRLF
1984
     chunk-size     = 1*HEXDIG
1985
     last-chunk     = 1*("0") [ chunk-ext ] CRLF
1986
1987
     chunk-data     = 1*OCTET ; a sequence of chunk-size octets
1988
1989
   The chunk-size field is a string of hex digits indicating the size of
1990
   the chunk-data in octets.  The chunked transfer coding is complete
1991
   when a chunk with a chunk-size of zero is received, possibly followed
1992
   by a trailer, and finally terminated by an empty line.
1993
1994
   A recipient MUST be able to parse and decode the chunked transfer
1995
   coding.
1996
1997
4.1.1.  Chunk Extensions
1998
1999
   The chunked encoding allows each chunk to include zero or more chunk
2000
   extensions, immediately following the chunk-size, for the sake of
2001
   supplying per-chunk metadata (such as a signature or hash),
2002
   mid-message control information, or randomization of message body
2003
   size.
2004
2005
     chunk-ext      = *( ";" chunk-ext-name [ "=" chunk-ext-val ] )
2006
2007
     chunk-ext-name = token
2008
     chunk-ext-val  = token / quoted-string
2009
2010
   The chunked encoding is specific to each connection and is likely to
2011
   be removed or recoded by each recipient (including intermediaries)
2012
   before any higher-level application would have a chance to inspect
2013
   the extensions.  Hence, use of chunk extensions is generally limited
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 36]
2020
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
2021
2022
2023
   to specialized HTTP services such as "long polling" (where client and
2024
   server can have shared expectations regarding the use of chunk
2025
   extensions) or for padding within an end-to-end secured connection.
2026
2027
   A recipient MUST ignore unrecognized chunk extensions.  A server
2028
   ought to limit the total length of chunk extensions received in a
2029
   request to an amount reasonable for the services provided, in the
2030
   same way that it applies length limitations and timeouts for other
2031
   parts of a message, and generate an appropriate 4xx (Client Error)
2032
   response if that amount is exceeded.
2033
2034
4.1.2.  Chunked Trailer Part
2035
2036
   A trailer allows the sender to include additional fields at the end
2037
   of a chunked message in order to supply metadata that might be
2038
   dynamically generated while the message body is sent, such as a
2039
   message integrity check, digital signature, or post-processing
2040
   status.  The trailer fields are identical to header fields, except
2041
   they are sent in a chunked trailer instead of the message's header
2042
   section.
2043
2044
     trailer-part   = *( header-field CRLF )
2045
2046
   A sender MUST NOT generate a trailer that contains a field necessary
2047
   for message framing (e.g., Transfer-Encoding and Content-Length),
2048
   routing (e.g., Host), request modifiers (e.g., controls and
2049
   conditionals in Section 5 of [RFC7231]), authentication (e.g., see
2050
   [RFC7235] and [RFC6265]), response control data (e.g., see Section
2051
   7.1 of [RFC7231]), or determining how to process the payload (e.g.,
2052
   Content-Encoding, Content-Type, Content-Range, and Trailer).
2053
2054
   When a chunked message containing a non-empty trailer is received,
2055
   the recipient MAY process the fields (aside from those forbidden
2056
   above) as if they were appended to the message's header section.  A
2057
   recipient MUST ignore (or consider as an error) any fields that are
2058
   forbidden to be sent in a trailer, since processing them as if they
2059
   were present in the header section might bypass external security
2060
   filters.
2061
2062
   Unless the request includes a TE header field indicating "trailers"
2063
   is acceptable, as described in Section 4.3, a server SHOULD NOT
2064
   generate trailer fields that it believes are necessary for the user
2065
   agent to receive.  Without a TE containing "trailers", the server
2066
   ought to assume that the trailer fields might be silently discarded
2067
   along the path to the user agent.  This requirement allows
2068
   intermediaries to forward a de-chunked message to an HTTP/1.0
2069
   recipient without buffering the entire response.
2070
2071
2072
2073
2074
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 37]
2076
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
2077
2078
2079
4.1.3.  Decoding Chunked
2080
2081
   A process for decoding the chunked transfer coding can be represented
2082
   in pseudo-code as:
2083
2084
     length := 0
2085
     read chunk-size, chunk-ext (if any), and CRLF
2086
     while (chunk-size > 0) {
2087
        read chunk-data and CRLF
2088
        append chunk-data to decoded-body
2089
        length := length + chunk-size
2090
        read chunk-size, chunk-ext (if any), and CRLF
2091
     }
2092
     read trailer field
2093
     while (trailer field is not empty) {
2094
        if (trailer field is allowed to be sent in a trailer) {
2095
            append trailer field to existing header fields
2096
        }
2097
        read trailer-field
2098
     }
2099
     Content-Length := length
2100
     Remove "chunked" from Transfer-Encoding
2101
     Remove Trailer from existing header fields
2102
2103
4.2.  Compression Codings
2104
2105
   The codings defined below can be used to compress the payload of a
2106
   message.
2107
2108
4.2.1.  Compress Coding
2109
2110
   The "compress" coding is an adaptive Lempel-Ziv-Welch (LZW) coding
2111
   [Welch] that is commonly produced by the UNIX file compression
2112
   program "compress".  A recipient SHOULD consider "x-compress" to be
2113
   equivalent to "compress".
2114
2115
4.2.2.  Deflate Coding
2116
2117
   The "deflate" coding is a "zlib" data format [RFC1950] containing a
2118
   "deflate" compressed data stream [RFC1951] that uses a combination of
2119
   the Lempel-Ziv (LZ77) compression algorithm and Huffman coding.
2120
2121
      Note: Some non-conformant implementations send the "deflate"
2122
      compressed data without the zlib wrapper.
2123
2124
2125
2126
2127
2128
2129
2130
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 38]
2132
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
2133
2134
2135
4.2.3.  Gzip Coding
2136
2137
   The "gzip" coding is an LZ77 coding with a 32-bit Cyclic Redundancy
2138
   Check (CRC) that is commonly produced by the gzip file compression
2139
   program [RFC1952].  A recipient SHOULD consider "x-gzip" to be
2140
   equivalent to "gzip".
2141
2142
4.3.  TE
2143
2144
   The "TE" header field in a request indicates what transfer codings,
2145
   besides chunked, the client is willing to accept in response, and
2146
   whether or not the client is willing to accept trailer fields in a
2147
   chunked transfer coding.
2148
2149
   The TE field-value consists of a comma-separated list of transfer
2150
   coding names, each allowing for optional parameters (as described in
2151
   Section 4), and/or the keyword "trailers".  A client MUST NOT send
2152
   the chunked transfer coding name in TE; chunked is always acceptable
2153
   for HTTP/1.1 recipients.
2154
2155
     TE        = #t-codings
2156
     t-codings = "trailers" / ( transfer-coding [ t-ranking ] )
2157
     t-ranking = OWS ";" OWS "q=" rank
2158
     rank      = ( "0" [ "." 0*3DIGIT ] )
2159
                / ( "1" [ "." 0*3("0") ] )
2160
2161
   Three examples of TE use are below.
2162
2163
     TE: deflate
2164
     TE:
2165
     TE: trailers, deflate;q=0.5
2166
2167
   The presence of the keyword "trailers" indicates that the client is
2168
   willing to accept trailer fields in a chunked transfer coding, as
2169
   defined in Section 4.1.2, on behalf of itself and any downstream
2170
   clients.  For requests from an intermediary, this implies that
2171
   either: (a) all downstream clients are willing to accept trailer
2172
   fields in the forwarded response; or, (b) the intermediary will
2173
   attempt to buffer the response on behalf of downstream recipients.
2174
   Note that HTTP/1.1 does not define any means to limit the size of a
2175
   chunked response such that an intermediary can be assured of
2176
   buffering the entire response.
2177
2178
   When multiple transfer codings are acceptable, the client MAY rank
2179
   the codings by preference using a case-insensitive "q" parameter
2180
   (similar to the qvalues used in content negotiation fields, Section
2181
2182
2183
2184
2185
2186
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 39]
2188
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
2189
2190
2191
   5.3.1 of [RFC7231]).  The rank value is a real number in the range 0
2192
   through 1, where 0.001 is the least preferred and 1 is the most
2193
   preferred; a value of 0 means "not acceptable".
2194
2195
   If the TE field-value is empty or if no TE field is present, the only
2196
   acceptable transfer coding is chunked.  A message with no transfer
2197
   coding is always acceptable.
2198
2199
   Since the TE header field only applies to the immediate connection, a
2200
   sender of TE MUST also send a "TE" connection option within the
2201
   Connection header field (Section 6.1) in order to prevent the TE
2202
   field from being forwarded by intermediaries that do not support its
2203
   semantics.
2204
2205
4.4.  Trailer
2206
2207
   When a message includes a message body encoded with the chunked
2208
   transfer coding and the sender desires to send metadata in the form
2209
   of trailer fields at the end of the message, the sender SHOULD
2210
   generate a Trailer header field before the message body to indicate
2211
   which fields will be present in the trailers.  This allows the
2212
   recipient to prepare for receipt of that metadata before it starts
2213
   processing the body, which is useful if the message is being streamed
2214
   and the recipient wishes to confirm an integrity check on the fly.
2215
2216
     Trailer = 1#field-name
2217
2218
5.  Message Routing
2219
2220
   HTTP request message routing is determined by each client based on
2221
   the target resource, the client's proxy configuration, and
2222
   establishment or reuse of an inbound connection.  The corresponding
2223
   response routing follows the same connection chain back to the
2224
   client.
2225
2226
5.1.  Identifying a Target Resource
2227
2228
   HTTP is used in a wide variety of applications, ranging from
2229
   general-purpose computers to home appliances.  In some cases,
2230
   communication options are hard-coded in a client's configuration.
2231
   However, most HTTP clients rely on the same resource identification
2232
   mechanism and configuration techniques as general-purpose Web
2233
   browsers.
2234
2235
   HTTP communication is initiated by a user agent for some purpose.
2236
   The purpose is a combination of request semantics, which are defined
2237
   in [RFC7231], and a target resource upon which to apply those
2238
   semantics.  A URI reference (Section 2.7) is typically used as an
2239
2240
2241
2242
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 40]
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2245
2246
2247
   identifier for the "target resource", which a user agent would
2248
   resolve to its absolute form in order to obtain the "target URI".
2249
   The target URI excludes the reference's fragment component, if any,
2250
   since fragment identifiers are reserved for client-side processing
2251
   ([RFC3986], Section 3.5).
2252
2253
5.2.  Connecting Inbound
2254
2255
   Once the target URI is determined, a client needs to decide whether a
2256
   network request is necessary to accomplish the desired semantics and,
2257
   if so, where that request is to be directed.
2258
2259
   If the client has a cache [RFC7234] and the request can be satisfied
2260
   by it, then the request is usually directed there first.
2261
2262
   If the request is not satisfied by a cache, then a typical client
2263
   will check its configuration to determine whether a proxy is to be
2264
   used to satisfy the request.  Proxy configuration is implementation-
2265
   dependent, but is often based on URI prefix matching, selective
2266
   authority matching, or both, and the proxy itself is usually
2267
   identified by an "http" or "https" URI.  If a proxy is applicable,
2268
   the client connects inbound by establishing (or reusing) a connection
2269
   to that proxy.
2270
2271
   If no proxy is applicable, a typical client will invoke a handler
2272
   routine, usually specific to the target URI's scheme, to connect
2273
   directly to an authority for the target resource.  How that is
2274
   accomplished is dependent on the target URI scheme and defined by its
2275
   associated specification, similar to how this specification defines
2276
   origin server access for resolution of the "http" (Section 2.7.1) and
2277
   "https" (Section 2.7.2) schemes.
2278
2279
   HTTP requirements regarding connection management are defined in
2280
   Section 6.
2281
2282
5.3.  Request Target
2283
2284
   Once an inbound connection is obtained, the client sends an HTTP
2285
   request message (Section 3) with a request-target derived from the
2286
   target URI.  There are four distinct formats for the request-target,
2287
   depending on both the method being requested and whether the request
2288
   is to a proxy.
2289
2290
     request-target = origin-form
2291
                    / absolute-form
2292
                    / authority-form
2293
                    / asterisk-form
2294
2295
2296
2297
2298
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 41]
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2301
2302
2303
5.3.1.  origin-form
2304
2305
   The most common form of request-target is the origin-form.
2306
2307
     origin-form    = absolute-path [ "?" query ]
2308
2309
   When making a request directly to an origin server, other than a
2310
   CONNECT or server-wide OPTIONS request (as detailed below), a client
2311
   MUST send only the absolute path and query components of the target
2312
   URI as the request-target.  If the target URI's path component is
2313
   empty, the client MUST send "/" as the path within the origin-form of
2314
   request-target.  A Host header field is also sent, as defined in
2315
   Section 5.4.
2316
2317
   For example, a client wishing to retrieve a representation of the
2318
   resource identified as
2319
2320
     http://www.example.org/where?q=now
2321
2322
   directly from the origin server would open (or reuse) a TCP
2323
   connection to port 80 of the host "www.example.org" and send the
2324
   lines:
2325
2326
     GET /where?q=now HTTP/1.1
2327
     Host: www.example.org
2328
2329
   followed by the remainder of the request message.
2330
2331
5.3.2.  absolute-form
2332
2333
   When making a request to a proxy, other than a CONNECT or server-wide
2334
   OPTIONS request (as detailed below), a client MUST send the target
2335
   URI in absolute-form as the request-target.
2336
2337
     absolute-form  = absolute-URI
2338
2339
   The proxy is requested to either service that request from a valid
2340
   cache, if possible, or make the same request on the client's behalf
2341
   to either the next inbound proxy server or directly to the origin
2342
   server indicated by the request-target.  Requirements on such
2343
   "forwarding" of messages are defined in Section 5.7.
2344
2345
   An example absolute-form of request-line would be:
2346
2347
     GET http://www.example.org/pub/WWW/TheProject.html HTTP/1.1
2348
2349
2350
2351
2352
2353
2354
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2357
2358
2359
   To allow for transition to the absolute-form for all requests in some
2360
   future version of HTTP, a server MUST accept the absolute-form in
2361
   requests, even though HTTP/1.1 clients will only send them in
2362
   requests to proxies.
2363
2364
5.3.3.  authority-form
2365
2366
   The authority-form of request-target is only used for CONNECT
2367
   requests (Section 4.3.6 of [RFC7231]).
2368
2369
     authority-form = authority
2370
2371
   When making a CONNECT request to establish a tunnel through one or
2372
   more proxies, a client MUST send only the target URI's authority
2373
   component (excluding any userinfo and its "@" delimiter) as the
2374
   request-target.  For example,
2375
2376
     CONNECT www.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1
2377
2378
5.3.4.  asterisk-form
2379
2380
   The asterisk-form of request-target is only used for a server-wide
2381
   OPTIONS request (Section 4.3.7 of [RFC7231]).
2382
2383
     asterisk-form  = "*"
2384
2385
   When a client wishes to request OPTIONS for the server as a whole, as
2386
   opposed to a specific named resource of that server, the client MUST
2387
   send only "*" (%x2A) as the request-target.  For example,
2388
2389
     OPTIONS * HTTP/1.1
2390
2391
   If a proxy receives an OPTIONS request with an absolute-form of
2392
   request-target in which the URI has an empty path and no query
2393
   component, then the last proxy on the request chain MUST send a
2394
   request-target of "*" when it forwards the request to the indicated
2395
   origin server.
2396
2397
   For example, the request
2398
2399
     OPTIONS http://www.example.org:8001 HTTP/1.1
2400
2401
   would be forwarded by the final proxy as
2402
2403
     OPTIONS * HTTP/1.1
2404
     Host: www.example.org:8001
2405
2406
   after connecting to port 8001 of host "www.example.org".
2407
2408
2409
2410
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 43]
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2413
2414
2415
5.4.  Host
2416
2417
   The "Host" header field in a request provides the host and port
2418
   information from the target URI, enabling the origin server to
2419
   distinguish among resources while servicing requests for multiple
2420
   host names on a single IP address.
2421
2422
     Host = uri-host [ ":" port ] ; Section 2.7.1
2423
2424
   A client MUST send a Host header field in all HTTP/1.1 request
2425
   messages.  If the target URI includes an authority component, then a
2426
   client MUST send a field-value for Host that is identical to that
2427
   authority component, excluding any userinfo subcomponent and its "@"
2428
   delimiter (Section 2.7.1).  If the authority component is missing or
2429
   undefined for the target URI, then a client MUST send a Host header
2430
   field with an empty field-value.
2431
2432
   Since the Host field-value is critical information for handling a
2433
   request, a user agent SHOULD generate Host as the first header field
2434
   following the request-line.
2435
2436
   For example, a GET request to the origin server for
2437
   <http://www.example.org/pub/WWW/> would begin with:
2438
2439
     GET /pub/WWW/ HTTP/1.1
2440
     Host: www.example.org
2441
2442
   A client MUST send a Host header field in an HTTP/1.1 request even if
2443
   the request-target is in the absolute-form, since this allows the
2444
   Host information to be forwarded through ancient HTTP/1.0 proxies
2445
   that might not have implemented Host.
2446
2447
   When a proxy receives a request with an absolute-form of
2448
   request-target, the proxy MUST ignore the received Host header field
2449
   (if any) and instead replace it with the host information of the
2450
   request-target.  A proxy that forwards such a request MUST generate a
2451
   new Host field-value based on the received request-target rather than
2452
   forward the received Host field-value.
2453
2454
   Since the Host header field acts as an application-level routing
2455
   mechanism, it is a frequent target for malware seeking to poison a
2456
   shared cache or redirect a request to an unintended server.  An
2457
   interception proxy is particularly vulnerable if it relies on the
2458
   Host field-value for redirecting requests to internal servers, or for
2459
   use as a cache key in a shared cache, without first verifying that
2460
   the intercepted connection is targeting a valid IP address for that
2461
   host.
2462
2463
2464
2465
2466
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 44]
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RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
2469
2470
2471
   A server MUST respond with a 400 (Bad Request) status code to any
2472
   HTTP/1.1 request message that lacks a Host header field and to any
2473
   request message that contains more than one Host header field or a
2474
   Host header field with an invalid field-value.
2475
2476
5.5.  Effective Request URI
2477
2478
   Since the request-target often contains only part of the user agent's
2479
   target URI, a server reconstructs the intended target as an
2480
   "effective request URI" to properly service the request.  This
2481
   reconstruction involves both the server's local configuration and
2482
   information communicated in the request-target, Host header field,
2483
   and connection context.
2484
2485
   For a user agent, the effective request URI is the target URI.
2486
2487
   If the request-target is in absolute-form, the effective request URI
2488
   is the same as the request-target.  Otherwise, the effective request
2489
   URI is constructed as follows:
2490
2491
      If the server's configuration (or outbound gateway) provides a
2492
      fixed URI scheme, that scheme is used for the effective request
2493
      URI.  Otherwise, if the request is received over a TLS-secured TCP
2494
      connection, the effective request URI's scheme is "https"; if not,
2495
      the scheme is "http".
2496
2497
      If the server's configuration (or outbound gateway) provides a
2498
      fixed URI authority component, that authority is used for the
2499
      effective request URI.  If not, then if the request-target is in
2500
      authority-form, the effective request URI's authority component is
2501
      the same as the request-target.  If not, then if a Host header
2502
      field is supplied with a non-empty field-value, the authority
2503
      component is the same as the Host field-value.  Otherwise, the
2504
      authority component is assigned the default name configured for
2505
      the server and, if the connection's incoming TCP port number
2506
      differs from the default port for the effective request URI's
2507
      scheme, then a colon (":") and the incoming port number (in
2508
      decimal form) are appended to the authority component.
2509
2510
      If the request-target is in authority-form or asterisk-form, the
2511
      effective request URI's combined path and query component is
2512
      empty.  Otherwise, the combined path and query component is the
2513
      same as the request-target.
2514
2515
      The components of the effective request URI, once determined as
2516
      above, can be combined into absolute-URI form by concatenating the
2517
      scheme, "://", authority, and combined path and query component.
2518
2519
2520
2521
2522
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 45]
2524
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
2525
2526
2527
   Example 1: the following message received over an insecure TCP
2528
   connection
2529
2530
     GET /pub/WWW/TheProject.html HTTP/1.1
2531
     Host: www.example.org:8080
2532
2533
   has an effective request URI of
2534
2535
     http://www.example.org:8080/pub/WWW/TheProject.html
2536
2537
   Example 2: the following message received over a TLS-secured TCP
2538
   connection
2539
2540
     OPTIONS * HTTP/1.1
2541
     Host: www.example.org
2542
2543
   has an effective request URI of
2544
2545
     https://www.example.org
2546
2547
   Recipients of an HTTP/1.0 request that lacks a Host header field
2548
   might need to use heuristics (e.g., examination of the URI path for
2549
   something unique to a particular host) in order to guess the
2550
   effective request URI's authority component.
2551
2552
   Once the effective request URI has been constructed, an origin server
2553
   needs to decide whether or not to provide service for that URI via
2554
   the connection in which the request was received.  For example, the
2555
   request might have been misdirected, deliberately or accidentally,
2556
   such that the information within a received request-target or Host
2557
   header field differs from the host or port upon which the connection
2558
   has been made.  If the connection is from a trusted gateway, that
2559
   inconsistency might be expected; otherwise, it might indicate an
2560
   attempt to bypass security filters, trick the server into delivering
2561
   non-public content, or poison a cache.  See Section 9 for security
2562
   considerations regarding message routing.
2563
2564
5.6.  Associating a Response to a Request
2565
2566
   HTTP does not include a request identifier for associating a given
2567
   request message with its corresponding one or more response messages.
2568
   Hence, it relies on the order of response arrival to correspond
2569
   exactly to the order in which requests are made on the same
2570
   connection.  More than one response message per request only occurs
2571
   when one or more informational responses (1xx, see Section 6.2 of
2572
   [RFC7231]) precede a final response to the same request.
2573
2574
2575
2576
2577
2578
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 46]
2580
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
2581
2582
2583
   A client that has more than one outstanding request on a connection
2584
   MUST maintain a list of outstanding requests in the order sent and
2585
   MUST associate each received response message on that connection to
2586
   the highest ordered request that has not yet received a final
2587
   (non-1xx) response.
2588
2589
5.7.  Message Forwarding
2590
2591
   As described in Section 2.3, intermediaries can serve a variety of
2592
   roles in the processing of HTTP requests and responses.  Some
2593
   intermediaries are used to improve performance or availability.
2594
   Others are used for access control or to filter content.  Since an
2595
   HTTP stream has characteristics similar to a pipe-and-filter
2596
   architecture, there are no inherent limits to the extent an
2597
   intermediary can enhance (or interfere) with either direction of the
2598
   stream.
2599
2600
   An intermediary not acting as a tunnel MUST implement the Connection
2601
   header field, as specified in Section 6.1, and exclude fields from
2602
   being forwarded that are only intended for the incoming connection.
2603
2604
   An intermediary MUST NOT forward a message to itself unless it is
2605
   protected from an infinite request loop.  In general, an intermediary
2606
   ought to recognize its own server names, including any aliases, local
2607
   variations, or literal IP addresses, and respond to such requests
2608
   directly.
2609
2610
5.7.1.  Via
2611
2612
   The "Via" header field indicates the presence of intermediate
2613
   protocols and recipients between the user agent and the server (on
2614
   requests) or between the origin server and the client (on responses),
2615
   similar to the "Received" header field in email (Section 3.6.7 of
2616
   [RFC5322]).  Via can be used for tracking message forwards, avoiding
2617
   request loops, and identifying the protocol capabilities of senders
2618
   along the request/response chain.
2619
2620
     Via = 1#( received-protocol RWS received-by [ RWS comment ] )
2621
2622
     received-protocol = [ protocol-name "/" ] protocol-version
2623
                         ; see Section 6.7
2624
     received-by       = ( uri-host [ ":" port ] ) / pseudonym
2625
     pseudonym         = token
2626
2627
   Multiple Via field values represent each proxy or gateway that has
2628
   forwarded the message.  Each intermediary appends its own information
2629
   about how the message was received, such that the end result is
2630
   ordered according to the sequence of forwarding recipients.
2631
2632
2633
2634
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 47]
2636
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
2637
2638
2639
   A proxy MUST send an appropriate Via header field, as described
2640
   below, in each message that it forwards.  An HTTP-to-HTTP gateway
2641
   MUST send an appropriate Via header field in each inbound request
2642
   message and MAY send a Via header field in forwarded response
2643
   messages.
2644
2645
   For each intermediary, the received-protocol indicates the protocol
2646
   and protocol version used by the upstream sender of the message.
2647
   Hence, the Via field value records the advertised protocol
2648
   capabilities of the request/response chain such that they remain
2649
   visible to downstream recipients; this can be useful for determining
2650
   what backwards-incompatible features might be safe to use in
2651
   response, or within a later request, as described in Section 2.6.
2652
   For brevity, the protocol-name is omitted when the received protocol
2653
   is HTTP.
2654
2655
   The received-by portion of the field value is normally the host and
2656
   optional port number of a recipient server or client that
2657
   subsequently forwarded the message.  However, if the real host is
2658
   considered to be sensitive information, a sender MAY replace it with
2659
   a pseudonym.  If a port is not provided, a recipient MAY interpret
2660
   that as meaning it was received on the default TCP port, if any, for
2661
   the received-protocol.
2662
2663
   A sender MAY generate comments in the Via header field to identify
2664
   the software of each recipient, analogous to the User-Agent and
2665
   Server header fields.  However, all comments in the Via field are
2666
   optional, and a recipient MAY remove them prior to forwarding the
2667
   message.
2668
2669
   For example, a request message could be sent from an HTTP/1.0 user
2670
   agent to an internal proxy code-named "fred", which uses HTTP/1.1 to
2671
   forward the request to a public proxy at p.example.net, which
2672
   completes the request by forwarding it to the origin server at
2673
   www.example.com.  The request received by www.example.com would then
2674
   have the following Via header field:
2675
2676
     Via: 1.0 fred, 1.1 p.example.net
2677
2678
   An intermediary used as a portal through a network firewall SHOULD
2679
   NOT forward the names and ports of hosts within the firewall region
2680
   unless it is explicitly enabled to do so.  If not enabled, such an
2681
   intermediary SHOULD replace each received-by host of any host behind
2682
   the firewall by an appropriate pseudonym for that host.
2683
2684
2685
2686
2687
2688
2689
2690
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 48]
2692
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
2693
2694
2695
   An intermediary MAY combine an ordered subsequence of Via header
2696
   field entries into a single such entry if the entries have identical
2697
   received-protocol values.  For example,
2698
2699
     Via: 1.0 ricky, 1.1 ethel, 1.1 fred, 1.0 lucy
2700
2701
   could be collapsed to
2702
2703
     Via: 1.0 ricky, 1.1 mertz, 1.0 lucy
2704
2705
   A sender SHOULD NOT combine multiple entries unless they are all
2706
   under the same organizational control and the hosts have already been
2707
   replaced by pseudonyms.  A sender MUST NOT combine entries that have
2708
   different received-protocol values.
2709
2710
5.7.2.  Transformations
2711
2712
   Some intermediaries include features for transforming messages and
2713
   their payloads.  A proxy might, for example, convert between image
2714
   formats in order to save cache space or to reduce the amount of
2715
   traffic on a slow link.  However, operational problems might occur
2716
   when these transformations are applied to payloads intended for
2717
   critical applications, such as medical imaging or scientific data
2718
   analysis, particularly when integrity checks or digital signatures
2719
   are used to ensure that the payload received is identical to the
2720
   original.
2721
2722
   An HTTP-to-HTTP proxy is called a "transforming proxy" if it is
2723
   designed or configured to modify messages in a semantically
2724
   meaningful way (i.e., modifications, beyond those required by normal
2725
   HTTP processing, that change the message in a way that would be
2726
   significant to the original sender or potentially significant to
2727
   downstream recipients).  For example, a transforming proxy might be
2728
   acting as a shared annotation server (modifying responses to include
2729
   references to a local annotation database), a malware filter, a
2730
   format transcoder, or a privacy filter.  Such transformations are
2731
   presumed to be desired by whichever client (or client organization)
2732
   selected the proxy.
2733
2734
   If a proxy receives a request-target with a host name that is not a
2735
   fully qualified domain name, it MAY add its own domain to the host
2736
   name it received when forwarding the request.  A proxy MUST NOT
2737
   change the host name if the request-target contains a fully qualified
2738
   domain name.
2739
2740
2741
2742
2743
2744
2745
2746
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 49]
2748
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
2749
2750
2751
   A proxy MUST NOT modify the "absolute-path" and "query" parts of the
2752
   received request-target when forwarding it to the next inbound
2753
   server, except as noted above to replace an empty path with "/" or
2754
   "*".
2755
2756
   A proxy MAY modify the message body through application or removal of
2757
   a transfer coding (Section 4).
2758
2759
   A proxy MUST NOT transform the payload (Section 3.3 of [RFC7231]) of
2760
   a message that contains a no-transform cache-control directive
2761
   (Section 5.2 of [RFC7234]).
2762
2763
   A proxy MAY transform the payload of a message that does not contain
2764
   a no-transform cache-control directive.  A proxy that transforms a
2765
   payload MUST add a Warning header field with the warn-code of 214
2766
   ("Transformation Applied") if one is not already in the message (see
2767
   Section 5.5 of [RFC7234]).  A proxy that transforms the payload of a
2768
   200 (OK) response can further inform downstream recipients that a
2769
   transformation has been applied by changing the response status code
2770
   to 203 (Non-Authoritative Information) (Section 6.3.4 of [RFC7231]).
2771
2772
   A proxy SHOULD NOT modify header fields that provide information
2773
   about the endpoints of the communication chain, the resource state,
2774
   or the selected representation (other than the payload) unless the
2775
   field's definition specifically allows such modification or the
2776
   modification is deemed necessary for privacy or security.
2777
2778
6.  Connection Management
2779
2780
   HTTP messaging is independent of the underlying transport- or
2781
   session-layer connection protocol(s).  HTTP only presumes a reliable
2782
   transport with in-order delivery of requests and the corresponding
2783
   in-order delivery of responses.  The mapping of HTTP request and
2784
   response structures onto the data units of an underlying transport
2785
   protocol is outside the scope of this specification.
2786
2787
   As described in Section 5.2, the specific connection protocols to be
2788
   used for an HTTP interaction are determined by client configuration
2789
   and the target URI.  For example, the "http" URI scheme
2790
   (Section 2.7.1) indicates a default connection of TCP over IP, with a
2791
   default TCP port of 80, but the client might be configured to use a
2792
   proxy via some other connection, port, or protocol.
2793
2794
2795
2796
2797
2798
2799
2800
2801
2802
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 50]
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RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
2805
2806
2807
   HTTP implementations are expected to engage in connection management,
2808
   which includes maintaining the state of current connections,
2809
   establishing a new connection or reusing an existing connection,
2810
   processing messages received on a connection, detecting connection
2811
   failures, and closing each connection.  Most clients maintain
2812
   multiple connections in parallel, including more than one connection
2813
   per server endpoint.  Most servers are designed to maintain thousands
2814
   of concurrent connections, while controlling request queues to enable
2815
   fair use and detect denial-of-service attacks.
2816
2817
6.1.  Connection
2818
2819
   The "Connection" header field allows the sender to indicate desired
2820
   control options for the current connection.  In order to avoid
2821
   confusing downstream recipients, a proxy or gateway MUST remove or
2822
   replace any received connection options before forwarding the
2823
   message.
2824
2825
   When a header field aside from Connection is used to supply control
2826
   information for or about the current connection, the sender MUST list
2827
   the corresponding field-name within the Connection header field.  A
2828
   proxy or gateway MUST parse a received Connection header field before
2829
   a message is forwarded and, for each connection-option in this field,
2830
   remove any header field(s) from the message with the same name as the
2831
   connection-option, and then remove the Connection header field itself
2832
   (or replace it with the intermediary's own connection options for the
2833
   forwarded message).
2834
2835
   Hence, the Connection header field provides a declarative way of
2836
   distinguishing header fields that are only intended for the immediate
2837
   recipient ("hop-by-hop") from those fields that are intended for all
2838
   recipients on the chain ("end-to-end"), enabling the message to be
2839
   self-descriptive and allowing future connection-specific extensions
2840
   to be deployed without fear that they will be blindly forwarded by
2841
   older intermediaries.
2842
2843
   The Connection header field's value has the following grammar:
2844
2845
     Connection        = 1#connection-option
2846
     connection-option = token
2847
2848
   Connection options are case-insensitive.
.../cache/cache.h 696
2849
2850
   A sender MUST NOT send a connection option corresponding to a header
2851
   field that is intended for all recipients of the payload.  For
2852
   example, Cache-Control is never appropriate as a connection option
2853
   (Section 5.2 of [RFC7234]).
2854
2855
2856
2857
2858
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 51]
2860
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
2861
2862
2863
   The connection options do not always correspond to a header field
2864
   present in the message, since a connection-specific header field
2865
   might not be needed if there are no parameters associated with a
2866
   connection option.  In contrast, a connection-specific header field
2867
   that is received without a corresponding connection option usually
2868
   indicates that the field has been improperly forwarded by an
2869
   intermediary and ought to be ignored by the recipient.
2870
2871
   When defining new connection options, specification authors ought to
2872
   survey existing header field names and ensure that the new connection
2873
   option does not share the same name as an already deployed header
2874
   field.  Defining a new connection option essentially reserves that
2875
   potential field-name for carrying additional information related to
2876
   the connection option, since it would be unwise for senders to use
2877
   that field-name for anything else.
2878
2879
   The "close" connection option is defined for a sender to signal that
2880
   this connection will be closed after completion of the response.  For
2881
   example,
2882
2883
     Connection: close
2884
2885
   in either the request or the response header fields indicates that
2886
   the sender is going to close the connection after the current
2887
   request/response is complete (Section 6.6).
2888
2889
   A client that does not support persistent connections MUST send the
2890
   "close" connection option in every request message.
2891
2892
   A server that does not support persistent connections MUST send the
2893
   "close" connection option in every response message that does not
2894
   have a 1xx (Informational) status code.
2895
2896
6.2.  Establishment
2897
2898
   It is beyond the scope of this specification to describe how
2899
   connections are established via various transport- or session-layer
2900
   protocols.  Each connection applies to only one transport link.
2901
2902
6.3.  Persistence
2903
2904
   HTTP/1.1 defaults to the use of "persistent connections", allowing
2905
   multiple requests and responses to be carried over a single
2906
   connection.  The "close" connection option is used to signal that a
2907
   connection will not persist after the current request/response.  HTTP
2908
   implementations SHOULD support persistent connections.
2909
2910
2911
2912
2913
2914
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 52]
2916
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
2917
2918
2919
   A recipient determines whether a connection is persistent or not
2920
   based on the most recently received message's protocol version and
2921
   Connection header field (if any):
2922
2923
   o  If the "close" connection option is present, the connection will
2924
      not persist after the current response; else,
2925
2926
   o  If the received protocol is HTTP/1.1 (or later), the connection
2927
      will persist after the current response; else,
2928
2929
   o  If the received protocol is HTTP/1.0, the "keep-alive" connection
2930
      option is present, the recipient is not a proxy, and the recipient
2931
      wishes to honor the HTTP/1.0 "keep-alive" mechanism, the
2932
      connection will persist after the current response; otherwise,
2933
2934
   o  The connection will close after the current response.
2935
2936
   A client MAY send additional requests on a persistent connection
2937
   until it sends or receives a "close" connection option or receives an
2938
   HTTP/1.0 response without a "keep-alive" connection option.
2939
2940
   In order to remain persistent, all messages on a connection need to
2941
   have a self-defined message length (i.e., one not defined by closure
2942
   of the connection), as described in Section 3.3.  A server MUST read
2943
   the entire request message body or close the connection after sending
2944
   its response, since otherwise the remaining data on a persistent
2945
   connection would be misinterpreted as the next request.  Likewise, a
2946
   client MUST read the entire response message body if it intends to
2947
   reuse the same connection for a subsequent request.
2948
2949
   A proxy server MUST NOT maintain a persistent connection with an
2950
   HTTP/1.0 client (see Section 19.7.1 of [RFC2068] for information and
2951
   discussion of the problems with the Keep-Alive header field
2952
   implemented by many HTTP/1.0 clients).
2953
2954
   See Appendix A.1.2 for more information on backwards compatibility
2955
   with HTTP/1.0 clients.
2956
2957
6.3.1.  Retrying Requests
2958
2959
   Connections can be closed at any time, with or without intention.
2960
   Implementations ought to anticipate the need to recover from
2961
   asynchronous close events.
2962
2963
2964
2965
2966
2967
2968
2969
2970
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 53]
2972
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
2973
2974
2975
   When an inbound connection is closed prematurely, a client MAY open a
2976
   new connection and automatically retransmit an aborted sequence of
2977
   requests if all of those requests have idempotent methods (Section
2978
   4.2.2 of [RFC7231]).  A proxy MUST NOT automatically retry
2979
   non-idempotent requests.
2980
2981
   A user agent MUST NOT automatically retry a request with a non-
2982
   idempotent method unless it has some means to know that the request
2983
   semantics are actually idempotent, regardless of the method, or some
2984
   means to detect that the original request was never applied.  For
2985
   example, a user agent that knows (through design or configuration)
2986
   that a POST request to a given resource is safe can repeat that
2987
   request automatically.  Likewise, a user agent designed specifically
2988
   to operate on a version control repository might be able to recover
2989
   from partial failure conditions by checking the target resource
2990
   revision(s) after a failed connection, reverting or fixing any
2991
   changes that were partially applied, and then automatically retrying
2992
   the requests that failed.
2993
2994
   A client SHOULD NOT automatically retry a failed automatic retry.
2995
2996
6.3.2.  Pipelining
2997
2998
   A client that supports persistent connections MAY "pipeline" its
2999
   requests (i.e., send multiple requests without waiting for each
3000
   response).  A server MAY process a sequence of pipelined requests in
3001
   parallel if they all have safe methods (Section 4.2.1 of [RFC7231]),
3002
   but it MUST send the corresponding responses in the same order that
3003
   the requests were received.
3004
3005
   A client that pipelines requests SHOULD retry unanswered requests if
3006
   the connection closes before it receives all of the corresponding
3007
   responses.  When retrying pipelined requests after a failed
3008
   connection (a connection not explicitly closed by the server in its
3009
   last complete response), a client MUST NOT pipeline immediately after
3010
   connection establishment, since the first remaining request in the
3011
   prior pipeline might have caused an error response that can be lost
3012
   again if multiple requests are sent on a prematurely closed
3013
   connection (see the TCP reset problem described in Section 6.6).
3014
3015
   Idempotent methods (Section 4.2.2 of [RFC7231]) are significant to
3016
   pipelining because they can be automatically retried after a
3017
   connection failure.  A user agent SHOULD NOT pipeline requests after
3018
   a non-idempotent method, until the final response status code for
3019
   that method has been received, unless the user agent has a means to
3020
   detect and recover from partial failure conditions involving the
3021
   pipelined sequence.
3022
3023
3024
3025
3026
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 54]
3028
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
3029
3030
3031
   An intermediary that receives pipelined requests MAY pipeline those
3032
   requests when forwarding them inbound, since it can rely on the
3033
   outbound user agent(s) to determine what requests can be safely
3034
   pipelined.  If the inbound connection fails before receiving a
3035
   response, the pipelining intermediary MAY attempt to retry a sequence
3036
   of requests that have yet to receive a response if the requests all
3037
   have idempotent methods; otherwise, the pipelining intermediary
3038
   SHOULD forward any received responses and then close the
3039
   corresponding outbound connection(s) so that the outbound user
3040
   agent(s) can recover accordingly.
3041
3042
6.4.  Concurrency
3043
3044
   A client ought to limit the number of simultaneous open connections
3045
   that it maintains to a given server.
3046
3047
   Previous revisions of HTTP gave a specific number of connections as a
3048
   ceiling, but this was found to be impractical for many applications.
3049
   As a result, this specification does not mandate a particular maximum
3050
   number of connections but, instead, encourages clients to be
3051
   conservative when opening multiple connections.
3052
3053
   Multiple connections are typically used to avoid the "head-of-line
3054
   blocking" problem, wherein a request that takes significant
3055
   server-side processing and/or has a large payload blocks subsequent
3056
   requests on the same connection.  However, each connection consumes
3057
   server resources.  Furthermore, using multiple connections can cause
3058
   undesirable side effects in congested networks.
3059
3060
   Note that a server might reject traffic that it deems abusive or
3061
   characteristic of a denial-of-service attack, such as an excessive
3062
   number of open connections from a single client.
3063
3064
6.5.  Failures and Timeouts
3065
3066
   Servers will usually have some timeout value beyond which they will
3067
   no longer maintain an inactive connection.  Proxy servers might make
3068
   this a higher value since it is likely that the client will be making
3069
   more connections through the same proxy server.  The use of
3070
   persistent connections places no requirements on the length (or
3071
   existence) of this timeout for either the client or the server.
3072
3073
   A client or server that wishes to time out SHOULD issue a graceful
3074
   close on the connection.  Implementations SHOULD constantly monitor
3075
   open connections for a received closure signal and respond to it as
3076
   appropriate, since prompt closure of both sides of a connection
3077
   enables allocated system resources to be reclaimed.
3078
3079
3080
3081
3082
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 55]
3084
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
3085
3086
3087
   A client, server, or proxy MAY close the transport connection at any
3088
   time.  For example, a client might have started to send a new request
3089
   at the same time that the server has decided to close the "idle"
3090
   connection.  From the server's point of view, the connection is being
3091
   closed while it was idle, but from the client's point of view, a
3092
   request is in progress.
3093
3094
   A server SHOULD sustain persistent connections, when possible, and
3095
   allow the underlying transport's flow-control mechanisms to resolve
3096
   temporary overloads, rather than terminate connections with the
3097
   expectation that clients will retry.  The latter technique can
3098
   exacerbate network congestion.
3099
3100
   A client sending a message body SHOULD monitor the network connection
3101
   for an error response while it is transmitting the request.  If the
3102
   client sees a response that indicates the server does not wish to
3103
   receive the message body and is closing the connection, the client
3104
   SHOULD immediately cease transmitting the body and close its side of
3105
   the connection.
3106
3107
6.6.  Tear-down
3108
3109
   The Connection header field (Section 6.1) provides a "close"
3110
   connection option that a sender SHOULD send when it wishes to close
3111
   the connection after the current request/response pair.
3112
3113
   A client that sends a "close" connection option MUST NOT send further
3114
   requests on that connection (after the one containing "close") and
3115
   MUST close the connection after reading the final response message
3116
   corresponding to this request.
3117
3118
   A server that receives a "close" connection option MUST initiate a
3119
   close of the connection (see below) after it sends the final response
3120
   to the request that contained "close".  The server SHOULD send a
3121
   "close" connection option in its final response on that connection.
3122
   The server MUST NOT process any further requests received on that
3123
   connection.
3124
3125
   A server that sends a "close" connection option MUST initiate a close
3126
   of the connection (see below) after it sends the response containing
3127
   "close".  The server MUST NOT process any further requests received
3128
   on that connection.
3129
3130
   A client that receives a "close" connection option MUST cease sending
3131
   requests on that connection and close the connection after reading
3132
   the response message containing the "close"; if additional pipelined
3133
   requests had been sent on the connection, the client SHOULD NOT
3134
   assume that they will be processed by the server.
3135
3136
3137
3138
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 56]
3140
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
3141
3142
3143
   If a server performs an immediate close of a TCP connection, there is
3144
   a significant risk that the client will not be able to read the last
3145
   HTTP response.  If the server receives additional data from the
3146
   client on a fully closed connection, such as another request that was
3147
   sent by the client before receiving the server's response, the
3148
   server's TCP stack will send a reset packet to the client;
3149
   unfortunately, the reset packet might erase the client's
3150
   unacknowledged input buffers before they can be read and interpreted
3151
   by the client's HTTP parser.
3152
3153
   To avoid the TCP reset problem, servers typically close a connection
3154
   in stages.  First, the server performs a half-close by closing only
3155
   the write side of the read/write connection.  The server then
3156
   continues to read from the connection until it receives a
3157
   corresponding close by the client, or until the server is reasonably
3158
   certain that its own TCP stack has received the client's
3159
   acknowledgement of the packet(s) containing the server's last
3160
   response.  Finally, the server fully closes the connection.
3161
3162
   It is unknown whether the reset problem is exclusive to TCP or might
3163
   also be found in other transport connection protocols.
3164
3165
6.7.  Upgrade
3166
3167
   The "Upgrade" header field is intended to provide a simple mechanism
3168
   for transitioning from HTTP/1.1 to some other protocol on the same
3169
   connection.  A client MAY send a list of protocols in the Upgrade
3170
   header field of a request to invite the server to switch to one or
3171
   more of those protocols, in order of descending preference, before
3172
   sending the final response.  A server MAY ignore a received Upgrade
3173
   header field if it wishes to continue using the current protocol on
3174
   that connection.  Upgrade cannot be used to insist on a protocol
3175
   change.
3176
3177
     Upgrade          = 1#protocol
3178
3179
     protocol         = protocol-name ["/" protocol-version]
3180
     protocol-name    = token
3181
     protocol-version = token
3182
3183
   A server that sends a 101 (Switching Protocols) response MUST send an
3184
   Upgrade header field to indicate the new protocol(s) to which the
3185
   connection is being switched; if multiple protocol layers are being
3186
   switched, the sender MUST list the protocols in layer-ascending
3187
   order.  A server MUST NOT switch to a protocol that was not indicated
3188
   by the client in the corresponding request's Upgrade header field.  A
3189
3190
3191
3192
3193
3194
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 57]
3196
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
3197
3198
3199
   server MAY choose to ignore the order of preference indicated by the
3200
   client and select the new protocol(s) based on other factors, such as
3201
   the nature of the request or the current load on the server.
3202
3203
   A server that sends a 426 (Upgrade Required) response MUST send an
3204
   Upgrade header field to indicate the acceptable protocols, in order
3205
   of descending preference.
3206
3207
   A server MAY send an Upgrade header field in any other response to
3208
   advertise that it implements support for upgrading to the listed
3209
   protocols, in order of descending preference, when appropriate for a
3210
   future request.
3211
3212
   The following is a hypothetical example sent by a client:
3213
3214
     GET /hello.txt HTTP/1.1
3215
     Host: www.example.com
3216
     Connection: upgrade
3217
     Upgrade: HTTP/2.0, SHTTP/1.3, IRC/6.9, RTA/x11
3218
3219
3220
   The capabilities and nature of the application-level communication
3221
   after the protocol change is entirely dependent upon the new
3222
   protocol(s) chosen.  However, immediately after sending the 101
3223
   (Switching Protocols) response, the server is expected to continue
3224
   responding to the original request as if it had received its
3225
   equivalent within the new protocol (i.e., the server still has an
3226
   outstanding request to satisfy after the protocol has been changed,
3227
   and is expected to do so without requiring the request to be
3228
   repeated).
3229
3230
   For example, if the Upgrade header field is received in a GET request
3231
   and the server decides to switch protocols, it first responds with a
3232
   101 (Switching Protocols) message in HTTP/1.1 and then immediately
3233
   follows that with the new protocol's equivalent of a response to a
3234
   GET on the target resource.  This allows a connection to be upgraded
3235
   to protocols with the same semantics as HTTP without the latency cost
3236
   of an additional round trip.  A server MUST NOT switch protocols
3237
   unless the received message semantics can be honored by the new
3238
   protocol; an OPTIONS request can be honored by any protocol.
3239
3240
3241
3242
3243
3244
3245
3246
3247
3248
3249
3250
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 58]
3252
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
3253
3254
3255
   The following is an example response to the above hypothetical
3256
   request:
3257
3258
     HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols
3259
     Connection: upgrade
3260
     Upgrade: HTTP/2.0
3261
3262
     [... data stream switches to HTTP/2.0 with an appropriate response
3263
     (as defined by new protocol) to the "GET /hello.txt" request ...]
3264
3265
   When Upgrade is sent, the sender MUST also send a Connection header
3266
   field (Section 6.1) that contains an "upgrade" connection option, in
3267
   order to prevent Upgrade from being accidentally forwarded by
3268
   intermediaries that might not implement the listed protocols.  A
3269
   server MUST ignore an Upgrade header field that is received in an
3270
   HTTP/1.0 request.
3271
3272
   A client cannot begin using an upgraded protocol on the connection
3273
   until it has completely sent the request message (i.e., the client
3274
   can't change the protocol it is sending in the middle of a message).
3275
   If a server receives both an Upgrade and an Expect header field with
3276
   the "100-continue" expectation (Section 5.1.1 of [RFC7231]), the
3277
   server MUST send a 100 (Continue) response before sending a 101
3278
   (Switching Protocols) response.
3279
3280
   The Upgrade header field only applies to switching protocols on top
3281
   of the existing connection; it cannot be used to switch the
3282
   underlying connection (transport) protocol, nor to switch the
3283
   existing communication to a different connection.  For those
3284
   purposes, it is more appropriate to use a 3xx (Redirection) response
3285
   (Section 6.4 of [RFC7231]).
3286
3287
   This specification only defines the protocol name "HTTP" for use by
3288
   the family of Hypertext Transfer Protocols, as defined by the HTTP
3289
   version rules of Section 2.6 and future updates to this
3290
   specification.  Additional tokens ought to be registered with IANA
3291
   using the registration procedure defined in Section 8.6.
3292
3293
7.  ABNF List Extension: #rule
3294
3295
   A #rule extension to the ABNF rules of [RFC5234] is used to improve
3296
   readability in the definitions of some header field values.
3297
3298
   A construct "#" is defined, similar to "*", for defining
3299
   comma-delimited lists of elements.  The full form is "<n>#<m>element"
3300
   indicating at least <n> and at most <m> elements, each separated by a
3301
   single comma (",") and optional whitespace (OWS).
3302
3303
3304
3305
3306
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 59]
3308
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
3309
3310
3311
   In any production that uses the list construct, a sender MUST NOT
3312
   generate empty list elements.  In other words, a sender MUST generate
3313
   lists that satisfy the following syntax:
3314
3315
     1#element => element *( OWS "," OWS element )
3316
3317
   and:
3318
3319
     #element => [ 1#element ]
3320
3321
   and for n >= 1 and m > 1:
3322
3323
     <n>#<m>element => element <n-1>*<m-1>( OWS "," OWS element )
3324
3325
   For compatibility with legacy list rules, a recipient MUST parse and
3326
   ignore a reasonable number of empty list elements: enough to handle
3327
   common mistakes by senders that merge values, but not so much that
3328
   they could be used as a denial-of-service mechanism.  In other words,
3329
   a recipient MUST accept lists that satisfy the following syntax:
3330
3331
     #element => [ ( "," / element ) *( OWS "," [ OWS element ] ) ]
3332
3333
     1#element => *( "," OWS ) element *( OWS "," [ OWS element ] )
3334
3335
   Empty elements do not contribute to the count of elements present.
3336
   For example, given these ABNF productions:
3337
3338
     example-list      = 1#example-list-elmt
3339
     example-list-elmt = token ; see Section 3.2.6
3340
3341
   Then the following are valid values for example-list (not including
3342
   the double quotes, which are present for delimitation only):
3343
3344
     "foo,bar"
3345
     "foo ,bar,"
3346
     "foo , ,bar,charlie   "
3347
3348
   In contrast, the following values would be invalid, since at least
3349
   one non-empty element is required by the example-list production:
3350
3351
     ""
3352
     ","
3353
     ",   ,"
3354
3355
   Appendix B shows the collected ABNF for recipients after the list
3356
   constructs have been expanded.
3357
3358
3359
3360
3361
3362
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 60]
3364
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
3365
3366
3367
8.  IANA Considerations
3368
3369
8.1.  Header Field Registration
3370
3371
   HTTP header fields are registered within the "Message Headers"
3372
   registry maintained at
3373
   <http://www.iana.org/assignments/message-headers/>.
3374
3375
   This document defines the following HTTP header fields, so the
3376
   "Permanent Message Header Field Names" registry has been updated
3377
   accordingly (see [BCP90]).
3378
3379
   +-------------------+----------+----------+---------------+
3380
   | Header Field Name | Protocol | Status   | Reference     |
3381
   +-------------------+----------+----------+---------------+
3382
   | Connection        | http     | standard | Section 6.1   |
3383
   | Content-Length    | http     | standard | Section 3.3.2 |
3384
   | Host              | http     | standard | Section 5.4   |
3385
   | TE                | http     | standard | Section 4.3   |
3386
   | Trailer           | http     | standard | Section 4.4   |
3387
   | Transfer-Encoding | http     | standard | Section 3.3.1 |
3388
   | Upgrade           | http     | standard | Section 6.7   |
3389
   | Via               | http     | standard | Section 5.7.1 |
3390
   +-------------------+----------+----------+---------------+
3391
3392
   Furthermore, the header field-name "Close" has been registered as
3393
   "reserved", since using that name as an HTTP header field might
3394
   conflict with the "close" connection option of the Connection header
3395
   field (Section 6.1).
3396
3397
   +-------------------+----------+----------+-------------+
3398
   | Header Field Name | Protocol | Status   | Reference   |
3399
   +-------------------+----------+----------+-------------+
3400
   | Close             | http     | reserved | Section 8.1 |
3401
   +-------------------+----------+----------+-------------+
3402
3403
   The change controller is: "IETF (iesg@ietf.org) - Internet
3404
   Engineering Task Force".
3405
3406
3407
3408
3409
3410
3411
3412
3413
3414
3415
3416
3417
3418
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 61]
3420
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
3421
3422
3423
8.2.  URI Scheme Registration
3424
3425
   IANA maintains the registry of URI Schemes [BCP115] at
3426
   <http://www.iana.org/assignments/uri-schemes/>.
3427
3428
   This document defines the following URI schemes, so the "Permanent
3429
   URI Schemes" registry has been updated accordingly.
3430
3431
   +------------+------------------------------------+---------------+
3432
   | URI Scheme | Description                        | Reference     |
3433
   +------------+------------------------------------+---------------+
3434
   | http       | Hypertext Transfer Protocol        | Section 2.7.1 |
3435
   | https      | Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure | Section 2.7.2 |
3436
   +------------+------------------------------------+---------------+
3437
3438
8.3.  Internet Media Type Registration
3439
3440
   IANA maintains the registry of Internet media types [BCP13] at
3441
   <http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.
3442
3443
   This document serves as the specification for the Internet media
3444
   types "message/http" and "application/http".  The following has been
3445
   registered with IANA.
3446
3447
8.3.1.  Internet Media Type message/http
3448
3449
   The message/http type can be used to enclose a single HTTP request or
3450
   response message, provided that it obeys the MIME restrictions for
3451
   all "message" types regarding line length and encodings.
3452
3453
   Type name:  message
3454
3455
   Subtype name:  http
3456
3457
   Required parameters:  N/A
3458
3459
   Optional parameters:  version, msgtype
3460
3461
      version:  The HTTP-version number of the enclosed message (e.g.,
3462
         "1.1").  If not present, the version can be determined from the
3463
         first line of the body.
3464
3465
      msgtype:  The message type -- "request" or "response".  If not
3466
         present, the type can be determined from the first line of the
3467
         body.
3468
3469
   Encoding considerations:  only "7bit", "8bit", or "binary" are
3470
      permitted
3471
3472
3473
3474
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 62]
3476
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
3477
3478
3479
   Security considerations:  see Section 9
3480
3481
   Interoperability considerations:  N/A
3482
3483
   Published specification:  This specification (see Section 8.3.1).
3484
3485
   Applications that use this media type:  N/A
3486
3487
   Fragment identifier considerations:  N/A
3488
3489
   Additional information:
3490
3491
      Magic number(s):  N/A
3492
3493
      Deprecated alias names for this type:  N/A
3494
3495
      File extension(s):  N/A
3496
3497
      Macintosh file type code(s):  N/A
3498
3499
   Person and email address to contact for further information:
3500
      See Authors' Addresses section.
3501
3502
   Intended usage:  COMMON
3503
3504
   Restrictions on usage:  N/A
3505
3506
   Author:  See Authors' Addresses section.
3507
3508
   Change controller:  IESG
3509
3510
8.3.2.  Internet Media Type application/http
3511
3512
   The application/http type can be used to enclose a pipeline of one or
3513
   more HTTP request or response messages (not intermixed).
3514
3515
   Type name:  application
3516
3517
   Subtype name:  http
3518
3519
   Required parameters:  N/A
3520
3521
   Optional parameters:  version, msgtype
3522
3523
      version:  The HTTP-version number of the enclosed messages (e.g.,
3524
         "1.1").  If not present, the version can be determined from the
3525
         first line of the body.
3526
3527
3528
3529
3530
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 63]
3532
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
3533
3534
3535
      msgtype:  The message type -- "request" or "response".  If not
3536
         present, the type can be determined from the first line of the
3537
         body.
3538
3539
   Encoding considerations:  HTTP messages enclosed by this type are in
3540
      "binary" format; use of an appropriate Content-Transfer-Encoding
3541
      is required when transmitted via email.
3542
3543
   Security considerations:  see Section 9
3544
3545
   Interoperability considerations:  N/A
3546
3547
   Published specification:  This specification (see Section 8.3.2).
3548
3549
   Applications that use this media type:  N/A
3550
3551
   Fragment identifier considerations:  N/A
3552
3553
   Additional information:
3554
3555
      Deprecated alias names for this type:  N/A
3556
3557
      Magic number(s):  N/A
3558
3559
      File extension(s):  N/A
3560
3561
      Macintosh file type code(s):  N/A
3562
3563
   Person and email address to contact for further information:
3564
      See Authors' Addresses section.
3565
3566
   Intended usage:  COMMON
3567
3568
   Restrictions on usage:  N/A
3569
3570
   Author:  See Authors' Addresses section.
3571
3572
   Change controller:  IESG
3573
3574
8.4.  Transfer Coding Registry
3575
3576
   The "HTTP Transfer Coding Registry" defines the namespace for
3577
   transfer coding names.  It is maintained at
3578
   <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-parameters>.
3579
3580
3581
3582
3583
3584
3585
3586
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 64]
3588
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
3589
3590
3591
8.4.1.  Procedure
3592
3593
   Registrations MUST include the following fields:
3594
3595
   o  Name
3596
3597
   o  Description
3598
3599
   o  Pointer to specification text
3600
3601
   Names of transfer codings MUST NOT overlap with names of content
3602
   codings (Section 3.1.2.1 of [RFC7231]) unless the encoding
3603
   transformation is identical, as is the case for the compression
3604
   codings defined in Section 4.2.
3605
3606
   Values to be added to this namespace require IETF Review (see Section
3607
   4.1 of [RFC5226]), and MUST conform to the purpose of transfer coding
3608
   defined in this specification.
3609
3610
   Use of program names for the identification of encoding formats is
3611
   not desirable and is discouraged for future encodings.
3612
3613
8.4.2.  Registration
3614
3615
   The "HTTP Transfer Coding Registry" has been updated with the
3616
   registrations below:
3617
3618
   +------------+--------------------------------------+---------------+
3619
   | Name       | Description                          | Reference     |
3620
   +------------+--------------------------------------+---------------+
3621
   | chunked    | Transfer in a series of chunks       | Section 4.1   |
3622
   | compress   | UNIX "compress" data format [Welch]  | Section 4.2.1 |
3623
   | deflate    | "deflate" compressed data            | Section 4.2.2 |
3624
   |            | ([RFC1951]) inside the "zlib" data   |               |
3625
   |            | format ([RFC1950])                   |               |
3626
   | gzip       | GZIP file format [RFC1952]           | Section 4.2.3 |
3627
   | x-compress | Deprecated (alias for compress)      | Section 4.2.1 |
3628
   | x-gzip     | Deprecated (alias for gzip)          | Section 4.2.3 |
3629
   +------------+--------------------------------------+---------------+
3630
3631
3632
3633
3634
3635
3636
3637
3638
3639
3640
3641
3642
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 65]
3644
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
3645
3646
3647
8.5.  Content Coding Registration
3648
3649
   IANA maintains the "HTTP Content Coding Registry" at
3650
   <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-parameters>.
3651
3652
   The "HTTP Content Coding Registry" has been updated with the
3653
   registrations below:
3654
3655
   +------------+--------------------------------------+---------------+
3656
   | Name       | Description                          | Reference     |
3657
   +------------+--------------------------------------+---------------+
3658
   | compress   | UNIX "compress" data format [Welch]  | Section 4.2.1 |
3659
   | deflate    | "deflate" compressed data            | Section 4.2.2 |
3660
   |            | ([RFC1951]) inside the "zlib" data   |               |
3661
   |            | format ([RFC1950])                   |               |
3662
   | gzip       | GZIP file format [RFC1952]           | Section 4.2.3 |
3663
   | x-compress | Deprecated (alias for compress)      | Section 4.2.1 |
3664
   | x-gzip     | Deprecated (alias for gzip)          | Section 4.2.3 |
3665
   +------------+--------------------------------------+---------------+
3666
3667
8.6.  Upgrade Token Registry
3668
3669
   The "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Upgrade Token Registry"
3670
   defines the namespace for protocol-name tokens used to identify
3671
   protocols in the Upgrade header field.  The registry is maintained at
3672
   <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-upgrade-tokens>.
3673
3674
8.6.1.  Procedure
3675
3676
   Each registered protocol name is associated with contact information
3677
   and an optional set of specifications that details how the connection
3678
   will be processed after it has been upgraded.
3679
3680
   Registrations happen on a "First Come First Served" basis (see
3681
   Section 4.1 of [RFC5226]) and are subject to the following rules:
3682
3683
   1.  A protocol-name token, once registered, stays registered forever.
3684
3685
   2.  The registration MUST name a responsible party for the
3686
       registration.
3687
3688
   3.  The registration MUST name a point of contact.
3689
3690
   4.  The registration MAY name a set of specifications associated with
3691
       that token.  Such specifications need not be publicly available.
3692
3693
   5.  The registration SHOULD name a set of expected "protocol-version"
3694
       tokens associated with that token at the time of registration.
3695
3696
3697
3698
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 66]
3700
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
3701
3702
3703
   6.  The responsible party MAY change the registration at any time.
3704
       The IANA will keep a record of all such changes, and make them
3705
       available upon request.
3706
3707
   7.  The IESG MAY reassign responsibility for a protocol token.  This
3708
       will normally only be used in the case when a responsible party
3709
       cannot be contacted.
3710
3711
   This registration procedure for HTTP Upgrade Tokens replaces that
3712
   previously defined in Section 7.2 of [RFC2817].
3713
3714
8.6.2.  Upgrade Token Registration
3715
3716
   The "HTTP" entry in the upgrade token registry has been updated with
3717
   the registration below:
3718
3719
   +-------+----------------------+----------------------+-------------+
3720
   | Value | Description          | Expected Version     | Reference   |
3721
   |       |                      | Tokens               |             |
3722
   +-------+----------------------+----------------------+-------------+
3723
   | HTTP  | Hypertext Transfer   | any DIGIT.DIGIT      | Section 2.6 |
3724
   |       | Protocol             | (e.g, "2.0")         |             |
3725
   +-------+----------------------+----------------------+-------------+
3726
3727
   The responsible party is: "IETF (iesg@ietf.org) - Internet
3728
   Engineering Task Force".
3729
3730
9.  Security Considerations
3731
3732
   This section is meant to inform developers, information providers,
3733
   and users of known security considerations relevant to HTTP message
3734
   syntax, parsing, and routing.  Security considerations about HTTP
3735
   semantics and payloads are addressed in [RFC7231].
3736
3737
9.1.  Establishing Authority
3738
3739
   HTTP relies on the notion of an authoritative response: a response
3740
   that has been determined by (or at the direction of) the authority
3741
   identified within the target URI to be the most appropriate response
3742
   for that request given the state of the target resource at the time
3743
   of response message origination.  Providing a response from a
3744
   non-authoritative source, such as a shared cache, is often useful to
3745
   improve performance and availability, but only to the extent that the
3746
   source can be trusted or the distrusted response can be safely used.
3747
3748
   Unfortunately, establishing authority can be difficult.  For example,
3749
   phishing is an attack on the user's perception of authority, where
3750
   that perception can be misled by presenting similar branding in
3751
3752
3753
3754
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 67]
3756
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
3757
3758
3759
   hypertext, possibly aided by userinfo obfuscating the authority
3760
   component (see Section 2.7.1).  User agents can reduce the impact of
3761
   phishing attacks by enabling users to easily inspect a target URI
3762
   prior to making an action, by prominently distinguishing (or
3763
   rejecting) userinfo when present, and by not sending stored
3764
   credentials and cookies when the referring document is from an
3765
   unknown or untrusted source.
3766
3767
   When a registered name is used in the authority component, the "http"
3768
   URI scheme (Section 2.7.1) relies on the user's local name resolution
3769
   service to determine where it can find authoritative responses.  This
3770
   means that any attack on a user's network host table, cached names,
3771
   or name resolution libraries becomes an avenue for attack on
3772
   establishing authority.  Likewise, the user's choice of server for
3773
   Domain Name Service (DNS), and the hierarchy of servers from which it
3774
   obtains resolution results, could impact the authenticity of address
3775
   mappings; DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC, [RFC4033]) are one way to
3776
   improve authenticity.
3777
3778
   Furthermore, after an IP address is obtained, establishing authority
3779
   for an "http" URI is vulnerable to attacks on Internet Protocol
3780
   routing.
3781
3782
   The "https" scheme (Section 2.7.2) is intended to prevent (or at
3783
   least reveal) many of these potential attacks on establishing
3784
   authority, provided that the negotiated TLS connection is secured and
3785
   the client properly verifies that the communicating server's identity
3786
   matches the target URI's authority component (see [RFC2818]).
3787
   Correctly implementing such verification can be difficult (see
3788
   [Georgiev]).
3789
3790
9.2.  Risks of Intermediaries
3791
3792
   By their very nature, HTTP intermediaries are men-in-the-middle and,
3793
   thus, represent an opportunity for man-in-the-middle attacks.
3794
   Compromise of the systems on which the intermediaries run can result
3795
   in serious security and privacy problems.  Intermediaries might have
3796
   access to security-related information, personal information about
3797
   individual users and organizations, and proprietary information
3798
   belonging to users and content providers.  A compromised
3799
   intermediary, or an intermediary implemented or configured without
3800
   regard to security and privacy considerations, might be used in the
3801
   commission of a wide range of potential attacks.
3802
3803
   Intermediaries that contain a shared cache are especially vulnerable
3804
   to cache poisoning attacks, as described in Section 8 of [RFC7234].
3805
3806
3807
3808
3809
3810
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 68]
3812
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
3813
3814
3815
   Implementers need to consider the privacy and security implications
3816
   of their design and coding decisions, and of the configuration
3817
   options they provide to operators (especially the default
3818
   configuration).
3819
3820
   Users need to be aware that intermediaries are no more trustworthy
3821
   than the people who run them; HTTP itself cannot solve this problem.
3822
3823
9.3.  Attacks via Protocol Element Length
3824
3825
   Because HTTP uses mostly textual, character-delimited fields, parsers
3826
   are often vulnerable to attacks based on sending very long (or very
3827
   slow) streams of data, particularly where an implementation is
3828
   expecting a protocol element with no predefined length.
3829
3830
   To promote interoperability, specific recommendations are made for
3831
   minimum size limits on request-line (Section 3.1.1) and header fields
3832
   (Section 3.2).  These are minimum recommendations, chosen to be
3833
   supportable even by implementations with limited resources; it is
3834
   expected that most implementations will choose substantially higher
3835
   limits.
3836
3837
   A server can reject a message that has a request-target that is too
3838
   long (Section 6.5.12 of [RFC7231]) or a request payload that is too
3839
   large (Section 6.5.11 of [RFC7231]).  Additional status codes related
3840
   to capacity limits have been defined by extensions to HTTP [RFC6585].
3841
3842
   Recipients ought to carefully limit the extent to which they process
3843
   other protocol elements, including (but not limited to) request
3844
   methods, response status phrases, header field-names, numeric values,
3845
   and body chunks.  Failure to limit such processing can result in
3846
   buffer overflows, arithmetic overflows, or increased vulnerability to
3847
   denial-of-service attacks.
3848
3849
9.4.  Response Splitting
3850
3851
   Response splitting (a.k.a, CRLF injection) is a common technique,
3852
   used in various attacks on Web usage, that exploits the line-based
3853
   nature of HTTP message framing and the ordered association of
3854
   requests to responses on persistent connections [Klein].  This
3855
   technique can be particularly damaging when the requests pass through
3856
   a shared cache.
3857
3858
   Response splitting exploits a vulnerability in servers (usually
3859
   within an application server) where an attacker can send encoded data
3860
   within some parameter of the request that is later decoded and echoed
3861
   within any of the response header fields of the response.  If the
3862
   decoded data is crafted to look like the response has ended and a
3863
3864
3865
3866
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 69]
3868
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
3869
3870
3871
   subsequent response has begun, the response has been split and the
3872
   content within the apparent second response is controlled by the
3873
   attacker.  The attacker can then make any other request on the same
3874
   persistent connection and trick the recipients (including
3875
   intermediaries) into believing that the second half of the split is
3876
   an authoritative answer to the second request.
3877
3878
   For example, a parameter within the request-target might be read by
3879
   an application server and reused within a redirect, resulting in the
3880
   same parameter being echoed in the Location header field of the
3881
   response.  If the parameter is decoded by the application and not
3882
   properly encoded when placed in the response field, the attacker can
3883
   send encoded CRLF octets and other content that will make the
3884
   application's single response look like two or more responses.
3885
3886
   A common defense against response splitting is to filter requests for
3887
   data that looks like encoded CR and LF (e.g., "%0D" and "%0A").
3888
   However, that assumes the application server is only performing URI
3889
   decoding, rather than more obscure data transformations like charset
3890
   transcoding, XML entity translation, base64 decoding, sprintf
3891
   reformatting, etc.  A more effective mitigation is to prevent
3892
   anything other than the server's core protocol libraries from sending
3893
   a CR or LF within the header section, which means restricting the
3894
   output of header fields to APIs that filter for bad octets and not
3895
   allowing application servers to write directly to the protocol
3896
   stream.
3897
3898
9.5.  Request Smuggling
3899
3900
   Request smuggling ([Linhart]) is a technique that exploits
3901
   differences in protocol parsing among various recipients to hide
3902
   additional requests (which might otherwise be blocked or disabled by
3903
   policy) within an apparently harmless request.  Like response
3904
   splitting, request smuggling can lead to a variety of attacks on HTTP
3905
   usage.
3906
3907
   This specification has introduced new requirements on request
3908
   parsing, particularly with regard to message framing in
3909
   Section 3.3.3, to reduce the effectiveness of request smuggling.
3910
3911
9.6.  Message Integrity
3912
3913
   HTTP does not define a specific mechanism for ensuring message
3914
   integrity, instead relying on the error-detection ability of
3915
   underlying transport protocols and the use of length or
3916
   chunk-delimited framing to detect completeness.  Additional integrity
3917
   mechanisms, such as hash functions or digital signatures applied to
3918
   the content, can be selectively added to messages via extensible
3919
3920
3921
3922
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 70]
3924
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
3925
3926
3927
   metadata header fields.  Historically, the lack of a single integrity
3928
   mechanism has been justified by the informal nature of most HTTP
3929
   communication.  However, the prevalence of HTTP as an information
3930
   access mechanism has resulted in its increasing use within
3931
   environments where verification of message integrity is crucial.
3932
3933
   User agents are encouraged to implement configurable means for
3934
   detecting and reporting failures of message integrity such that those
3935
   means can be enabled within environments for which integrity is
3936
   necessary.  For example, a browser being used to view medical history
3937
   or drug interaction information needs to indicate to the user when
3938
   such information is detected by the protocol to be incomplete,
3939
   expired, or corrupted during transfer.  Such mechanisms might be
3940
   selectively enabled via user agent extensions or the presence of
3941
   message integrity metadata in a response.  At a minimum, user agents
3942
   ought to provide some indication that allows a user to distinguish
3943
   between a complete and incomplete response message (Section 3.4) when
3944
   such verification is desired.
3945
3946
9.7.  Message Confidentiality
3947
3948
   HTTP relies on underlying transport protocols to provide message
3949
   confidentiality when that is desired.  HTTP has been specifically
3950
   designed to be independent of the transport protocol, such that it
3951
   can be used over many different forms of encrypted connection, with
3952
   the selection of such transports being identified by the choice of
3953
   URI scheme or within user agent configuration.
3954
3955
   The "https" scheme can be used to identify resources that require a
3956
   confidential connection, as described in Section 2.7.2.
3957
3958
9.8.  Privacy of Server Log Information
3959
3960
   A server is in the position to save personal data about a user's
3961
   requests over time, which might identify their reading patterns or
3962
   subjects of interest.  In particular, log information gathered at an
3963
   intermediary often contains a history of user agent interaction,
3964
   across a multitude of sites, that can be traced to individual users.
3965
3966
   HTTP log information is confidential in nature; its handling is often
3967
   constrained by laws and regulations.  Log information needs to be
3968
   securely stored and appropriate guidelines followed for its analysis.
3969
   Anonymization of personal information within individual entries
3970
   helps, but it is generally not sufficient to prevent real log traces
3971
   from being re-identified based on correlation with other access
3972
   characteristics.  As such, access traces that are keyed to a specific
3973
   client are unsafe to publish even if the key is pseudonymous.
3974
3975
3976
3977
3978
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 71]
3980
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
3981
3982
3983
   To minimize the risk of theft or accidental publication, log
3984
   information ought to be purged of personally identifiable
3985
   information, including user identifiers, IP addresses, and
3986
   user-provided query parameters, as soon as that information is no
3987
   longer necessary to support operational needs for security, auditing,
3988
   or fraud control.
3989
3990
10.  Acknowledgments
3991
3992
   This edition of HTTP/1.1 builds on the many contributions that went
3993
   into RFC 1945, RFC 2068, RFC 2145, and RFC 2616, including
3994
   substantial contributions made by the previous authors, editors, and
3995
   Working Group Chairs: Tim Berners-Lee, Ari Luotonen, Roy T. Fielding,
3996
   Henrik Frystyk Nielsen, Jim Gettys, Jeffrey C. Mogul, Larry Masinter,
3997
   and Paul J. Leach.  Mark Nottingham oversaw this effort as Working
3998
   Group Chair.
3999
4000
   Since 1999, the following contributors have helped improve the HTTP
4001
   specification by reporting bugs, asking smart questions, drafting or
4002
   reviewing text, and evaluating open issues:
4003
4004
   Adam Barth, Adam Roach, Addison Phillips, Adrian Chadd, Adrian Cole,
4005
   Adrien W. de Croy, Alan Ford, Alan Ruttenberg, Albert Lunde, Alek
4006
   Storm, Alex Rousskov, Alexandre Morgaut, Alexey Melnikov, Alisha
4007
   Smith, Amichai Rothman, Amit Klein, Amos Jeffries, Andreas Maier,
4008
   Andreas Petersson, Andrei Popov, Anil Sharma, Anne van Kesteren,
4009
   Anthony Bryan, Asbjorn Ulsberg, Ashok Kumar, Balachander
4010
   Krishnamurthy, Barry Leiba, Ben Laurie, Benjamin Carlyle, Benjamin
4011
   Niven-Jenkins, Benoit Claise, Bil Corry, Bill Burke, Bjoern
4012
   Hoehrmann, Bob Scheifler, Boris Zbarsky, Brett Slatkin, Brian Kell,
4013
   Brian McBarron, Brian Pane, Brian Raymor, Brian Smith, Bruce Perens,
4014
   Bryce Nesbitt, Cameron Heavon-Jones, Carl Kugler, Carsten Bormann,
4015
   Charles Fry, Chris Burdess, Chris Newman, Christian Huitema, Cyrus
4016
   Daboo, Dale Robert Anderson, Dan Wing, Dan Winship, Daniel Stenberg,
4017
   Darrel Miller, Dave Cridland, Dave Crocker, Dave Kristol, Dave
4018
   Thaler, David Booth, David Singer, David W. Morris, Diwakar Shetty,
4019
   Dmitry Kurochkin, Drummond Reed, Duane Wessels, Edward Lee, Eitan
4020
   Adler, Eliot Lear, Emile Stephan, Eran Hammer-Lahav, Eric D.
4021
   Williams, Eric J. Bowman, Eric Lawrence, Eric Rescorla, Erik
4022
   Aronesty, EungJun Yi, Evan Prodromou, Felix Geisendoerfer, Florian
4023
   Weimer, Frank Ellermann, Fred Akalin, Fred Bohle, Frederic Kayser,
4024
   Gabor Molnar, Gabriel Montenegro, Geoffrey Sneddon, Gervase Markham,
4025
   Gili Tzabari, Grahame Grieve, Greg Slepak, Greg Wilkins, Grzegorz
4026
   Calkowski, Harald Tveit Alvestrand, Harry Halpin, Helge Hess, Henrik
4027
   Nordstrom, Henry S. Thompson, Henry Story, Herbert van de Sompel,
4028
   Herve Ruellan, Howard Melman, Hugo Haas, Ian Fette, Ian Hickson, Ido
4029
   Safruti, Ilari Liusvaara, Ilya Grigorik, Ingo Struck, J. Ross Nicoll,
4030
   James Cloos, James H. Manger, James Lacey, James M. Snell, Jamie
4031
4032
4033
4034
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 72]
4036
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
4037
4038
4039
   Lokier, Jan Algermissen, Jari Arkko, Jeff Hodges (who came up with
4040
   the term 'effective Request-URI'), Jeff Pinner, Jeff Walden, Jim
4041
   Luther, Jitu Padhye, Joe D. Williams, Joe Gregorio, Joe Orton, Joel
4042
   Jaeggli, John C. Klensin, John C. Mallery, John Cowan, John Kemp,
4043
   John Panzer, John Schneider, John Stracke, John Sullivan, Jonas
4044
   Sicking, Jonathan A. Rees, Jonathan Billington, Jonathan Moore,
4045
   Jonathan Silvera, Jordi Ros, Joris Dobbelsteen, Josh Cohen, Julien
4046
   Pierre, Jungshik Shin, Justin Chapweske, Justin Erenkrantz, Justin
4047
   James, Kalvinder Singh, Karl Dubost, Kathleen Moriarty, Keith
4048
   Hoffman, Keith Moore, Ken Murchison, Koen Holtman, Konstantin
4049
   Voronkov, Kris Zyp, Leif Hedstrom, Lionel Morand, Lisa Dusseault,
4050
   Maciej Stachowiak, Manu Sporny, Marc Schneider, Marc Slemko, Mark
4051
   Baker, Mark Pauley, Mark Watson, Markus Isomaki, Markus Lanthaler,
4052
   Martin J. Duerst, Martin Musatov, Martin Nilsson, Martin Thomson,
4053
   Matt Lynch, Matthew Cox, Matthew Kerwin, Max Clark, Menachem Dodge,
4054
   Meral Shirazipour, Michael Burrows, Michael Hausenblas, Michael
4055
   Scharf, Michael Sweet, Michael Tuexen, Michael Welzl, Mike Amundsen,
4056
   Mike Belshe, Mike Bishop, Mike Kelly, Mike Schinkel, Miles Sabin,
4057
   Murray S. Kucherawy, Mykyta Yevstifeyev, Nathan Rixham, Nicholas
4058
   Shanks, Nico Williams, Nicolas Alvarez, Nicolas Mailhot, Noah Slater,
4059
   Osama Mazahir, Pablo Castro, Pat Hayes, Patrick R. McManus, Paul E.
4060
   Jones, Paul Hoffman, Paul Marquess, Pete Resnick, Peter Lepeska,
4061
   Peter Occil, Peter Saint-Andre, Peter Watkins, Phil Archer, Phil
4062
   Hunt, Philippe Mougin, Phillip Hallam-Baker, Piotr Dobrogost, Poul-
4063
   Henning Kamp, Preethi Natarajan, Rajeev Bector, Ray Polk, Reto
4064
   Bachmann-Gmuer, Richard Barnes, Richard Cyganiak, Rob Trace, Robby
4065
   Simpson, Robert Brewer, Robert Collins, Robert Mattson, Robert
4066
   O'Callahan, Robert Olofsson, Robert Sayre, Robert Siemer, Robert de
4067
   Wilde, Roberto Javier Godoy, Roberto Peon, Roland Zink, Ronny
4068
   Widjaja, Ryan Hamilton, S. Mike Dierken, Salvatore Loreto, Sam
4069
   Johnston, Sam Pullara, Sam Ruby, Saurabh Kulkarni, Scott Lawrence
4070
   (who maintained the original issues list), Sean B. Palmer, Sean
4071
   Turner, Sebastien Barnoud, Shane McCarron, Shigeki Ohtsu, Simon
4072
   Yarde, Stefan Eissing, Stefan Tilkov, Stefanos Harhalakis, Stephane
4073
   Bortzmeyer, Stephen Farrell, Stephen Kent, Stephen Ludin, Stuart
4074
   Williams, Subbu Allamaraju, Subramanian Moonesamy, Susan Hares,
4075
   Sylvain Hellegouarch, Tapan Divekar, Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa, Tatsuya
4076
   Hayashi, Ted Hardie, Ted Lemon, Thomas Broyer, Thomas Fossati, Thomas
4077
   Maslen, Thomas Nadeau, Thomas Nordin, Thomas Roessler, Tim Bray, Tim
4078
   Morgan, Tim Olsen, Tom Zhou, Travis Snoozy, Tyler Close, Vincent
4079
   Murphy, Wenbo Zhu, Werner Baumann, Wilbur Streett, Wilfredo Sanchez
4080
   Vega, William A. Rowe Jr., William Chan, Willy Tarreau, Xiaoshu Wang,
4081
   Yaron Goland, Yngve Nysaeter Pettersen, Yoav Nir, Yogesh Bang,
4082
   Yuchung Cheng, Yutaka Oiwa, Yves Lafon (long-time member of the
4083
   editor team), Zed A. Shaw, and Zhong Yu.
4084
4085
   See Section 16 of [RFC2616] for additional acknowledgements from
4086
   prior revisions.
4087
4088
4089
4090
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 73]
4092
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
4093
4094
4095
11.  References
4096
4097
11.1.  Normative References
4098
4099
   [RFC0793]     Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
4100
                 RFC 793, September 1981.
4101
4102
   [RFC1950]     Deutsch, L. and J-L. Gailly, "ZLIB Compressed Data
4103
                 Format Specification version 3.3", RFC 1950, May 1996.
4104
4105
   [RFC1951]     Deutsch, P., "DEFLATE Compressed Data Format
4106
                 Specification version 1.3", RFC 1951, May 1996.
4107
4108
   [RFC1952]     Deutsch, P., Gailly, J-L., Adler, M., Deutsch, L., and
4109
                 G. Randers-Pehrson, "GZIP file format specification
4110
                 version 4.3", RFC 1952, May 1996.
4111
4112
   [RFC2119]     Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
4113
                 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
4114
4115
   [RFC3986]     Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter,
4116
                 "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax",
4117
                 STD 66, RFC 3986, January 2005.
4118
4119
   [RFC5234]     Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for
4120
                 Syntax Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
4121
                 January 2008.
4122
4123
   [RFC7231]     Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext
4124
                 Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content",
4125
                 RFC 7231, June 2014.
4126
4127
   [RFC7232]     Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext
4128
                 Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Conditional Requests",
4129
                 RFC 7232, June 2014.
4130
4131
   [RFC7233]     Fielding, R., Ed., Lafon, Y., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed.,
4132
                 "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Range
4133
                 Requests", RFC 7233, June 2014.
4134
4135
   [RFC7234]     Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
4136
                 Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching",
4137
                 RFC 7234, June 2014.
4138
4139
   [RFC7235]     Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext
4140
                 Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication",
4141
                 RFC 7235, June 2014.
4142
4143
4144
4145
4146
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 74]
4148
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
4149
4150
4151
   [USASCII]     American National Standards Institute, "Coded Character
4152
                 Set -- 7-bit American Standard Code for Information
4153
                 Interchange", ANSI X3.4, 1986.
4154
4155
   [Welch]       Welch, T., "A Technique for High-Performance Data
4156
                 Compression", IEEE Computer 17(6), June 1984.
4157
4158
11.2.  Informative References
4159
4160
   [BCP115]      Hansen, T., Hardie, T., and L. Masinter, "Guidelines
4161
                 and Registration Procedures for New URI Schemes",
4162
                 BCP 115, RFC 4395, February 2006.
4163
4164
   [BCP13]       Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
4165
                 Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
4166
                 RFC 6838, January 2013.
4167
4168
   [BCP90]       Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration
4169
                 Procedures for Message Header Fields", BCP 90,
4170
                 RFC 3864, September 2004.
4171
4172
   [Georgiev]    Georgiev, M., Iyengar, S., Jana, S., Anubhai, R.,
4173
                 Boneh, D., and V. Shmatikov, "The Most Dangerous Code
4174
                 in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-
4175
                 browser Software", In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM
4176
                 Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS
4177
                 '12), pp. 38-49, October 2012,
4178
                 <http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2382196.2382204>.
4179
4180
   [ISO-8859-1]  International Organization for Standardization,
4181
                 "Information technology -- 8-bit single-byte coded
4182
                 graphic character sets -- Part 1: Latin alphabet No.
4183
                 1", ISO/IEC 8859-1:1998, 1998.
4184
4185
   [Klein]       Klein, A., "Divide and Conquer - HTTP Response
4186
                 Splitting, Web Cache Poisoning Attacks, and Related
4187
                 Topics", March 2004, <http://packetstormsecurity.com/
4188
                 papers/general/whitepaper_httpresponse.pdf>.
4189
4190
   [Kri2001]     Kristol, D., "HTTP Cookies: Standards, Privacy, and
4191
                 Politics", ACM Transactions on Internet
4192
                 Technology 1(2), November 2001,
4193
                 <http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.SE/0105018>.
4194
4195
   [Linhart]     Linhart, C., Klein, A., Heled, R., and S. Orrin, "HTTP
4196
                 Request Smuggling", June 2005,
4197
                 <http://www.watchfire.com/news/whitepapers.aspx>.
4198
4199
4200
4201
4202
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 75]
4204
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
4205
4206
4207
   [RFC1919]     Chatel, M., "Classical versus Transparent IP Proxies",
4208
                 RFC 1919, March 1996.
4209
4210
   [RFC1945]     Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and H. Nielsen,
4211
                 "Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.0", RFC 1945,
4212
                 May 1996.
4213
4214
   [RFC2045]     Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet
4215
                 Mail Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet
4216
                 Message Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996.
4217
4218
   [RFC2047]     Moore, K., "MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail
4219
                 Extensions) Part Three: Message Header Extensions for
4220
                 Non-ASCII Text", RFC 2047, November 1996.
4221
4222
   [RFC2068]     Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Nielsen, H., and
4223
                 T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol --
4224
                 HTTP/1.1", RFC 2068, January 1997.
4225
4226
   [RFC2145]     Mogul, J., Fielding, R., Gettys, J., and H. Nielsen,
4227
                 "Use and Interpretation of HTTP Version Numbers",
4228
                 RFC 2145, May 1997.
4229
4230
   [RFC2616]     Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
4231
                 Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
4232
                 Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
4233
4234
   [RFC2817]     Khare, R. and S. Lawrence, "Upgrading to TLS Within
4235
                 HTTP/1.1", RFC 2817, May 2000.
4236
4237
   [RFC2818]     Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
4238
4239
   [RFC3040]     Cooper, I., Melve, I., and G. Tomlinson, "Internet Web
4240
                 Replication and Caching Taxonomy", RFC 3040,
4241
                 January 2001.
4242
4243
   [RFC4033]     Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
4244
                 Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
4245
                 RFC 4033, March 2005.
4246
4247
   [RFC4559]     Jaganathan, K., Zhu, L., and J. Brezak, "SPNEGO-based
4248
                 Kerberos and NTLM HTTP Authentication in Microsoft
4249
                 Windows", RFC 4559, June 2006.
4250
4251
   [RFC5226]     Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing
4252
                 an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
4253
                 RFC 5226, May 2008.
4254
4255
4256
4257
4258
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 76]
4260
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
4261
4262
4263
   [RFC5246]     Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer
4264
                 Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
4265
                 August 2008.
4266
4267
   [RFC5322]     Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
4268
                 October 2008.
4269
4270
   [RFC6265]     Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
4271
                 April 2011.
4272
4273
   [RFC6585]     Nottingham, M. and R. Fielding, "Additional HTTP Status
4274
                 Codes", RFC 6585, April 2012.
4275
4276
4277
4278
4279
4280
4281
4282
4283
4284
4285
4286
4287
4288
4289
4290
4291
4292
4293
4294
4295
4296
4297
4298
4299
4300
4301
4302
4303
4304
4305
4306
4307
4308
4309
4310
4311
4312
4313
4314
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 77]
4316
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
4317
4318
4319
Appendix A.  HTTP Version History
4320
4321
   HTTP has been in use since 1990.  The first version, later referred
4322
   to as HTTP/0.9, was a simple protocol for hypertext data transfer
4323
   across the Internet, using only a single request method (GET) and no
4324
   metadata.  HTTP/1.0, as defined by [RFC1945], added a range of
4325
   request methods and MIME-like messaging, allowing for metadata to be
4326
   transferred and modifiers placed on the request/response semantics.
4327
   However, HTTP/1.0 did not sufficiently take into consideration the
4328
   effects of hierarchical proxies, caching, the need for persistent
4329
   connections, or name-based virtual hosts.  The proliferation of
4330
   incompletely implemented applications calling themselves "HTTP/1.0"
4331
   further necessitated a protocol version change in order for two
4332
   communicating applications to determine each other's true
4333
   capabilities.
4334
4335
   HTTP/1.1 remains compatible with HTTP/1.0 by including more stringent
4336
   requirements that enable reliable implementations, adding only those
4337
   features that can either be safely ignored by an HTTP/1.0 recipient
4338
   or only be sent when communicating with a party advertising
4339
   conformance with HTTP/1.1.
4340
4341
   HTTP/1.1 has been designed to make supporting previous versions easy.
4342
   A general-purpose HTTP/1.1 server ought to be able to understand any
4343
   valid request in the format of HTTP/1.0, responding appropriately
4344
   with an HTTP/1.1 message that only uses features understood (or
4345
   safely ignored) by HTTP/1.0 clients.  Likewise, an HTTP/1.1 client
4346
   can be expected to understand any valid HTTP/1.0 response.
4347
4348
   Since HTTP/0.9 did not support header fields in a request, there is
4349
   no mechanism for it to support name-based virtual hosts (selection of
4350
   resource by inspection of the Host header field).  Any server that
4351
   implements name-based virtual hosts ought to disable support for
4352
   HTTP/0.9.  Most requests that appear to be HTTP/0.9 are, in fact,
4353
   badly constructed HTTP/1.x requests caused by a client failing to
4354
   properly encode the request-target.
4355
4356
A.1.  Changes from HTTP/1.0
4357
4358
   This section summarizes major differences between versions HTTP/1.0
4359
   and HTTP/1.1.
4360
4361
A.1.1.  Multihomed Web Servers
4362
4363
   The requirements that clients and servers support the Host header
4364
   field (Section 5.4), report an error if it is missing from an
4365
   HTTP/1.1 request, and accept absolute URIs (Section 5.3) are among
4366
   the most important changes defined by HTTP/1.1.
4367
4368
4369
4370
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 78]
4372
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
4373
4374
4375
   Older HTTP/1.0 clients assumed a one-to-one relationship of IP
4376
   addresses and servers; there was no other established mechanism for
4377
   distinguishing the intended server of a request than the IP address
4378
   to which that request was directed.  The Host header field was
4379
   introduced during the development of HTTP/1.1 and, though it was
4380
   quickly implemented by most HTTP/1.0 browsers, additional
4381
   requirements were placed on all HTTP/1.1 requests in order to ensure
4382
   complete adoption.  At the time of this writing, most HTTP-based
4383
   services are dependent upon the Host header field for targeting
4384
   requests.
4385
4386
A.1.2.  Keep-Alive Connections
4387
4388
   In HTTP/1.0, each connection is established by the client prior to
4389
   the request and closed by the server after sending the response.
4390
   However, some implementations implement the explicitly negotiated
4391
   ("Keep-Alive") version of persistent connections described in Section
4392
   19.7.1 of [RFC2068].
4393
4394
   Some clients and servers might wish to be compatible with these
4395
   previous approaches to persistent connections, by explicitly
4396
   negotiating for them with a "Connection: keep-alive" request header
4397
   field.  However, some experimental implementations of HTTP/1.0
4398
   persistent connections are faulty; for example, if an HTTP/1.0 proxy
4399
   server doesn't understand Connection, it will erroneously forward
4400
   that header field to the next inbound server, which would result in a
4401
   hung connection.
4402
4403
   One attempted solution was the introduction of a Proxy-Connection
4404
   header field, targeted specifically at proxies.  In practice, this
4405
   was also unworkable, because proxies are often deployed in multiple
4406
   layers, bringing about the same problem discussed above.
4407
4408
   As a result, clients are encouraged not to send the Proxy-Connection
4409
   header field in any requests.
4410
4411
   Clients are also encouraged to consider the use of Connection:
4412
   keep-alive in requests carefully; while they can enable persistent
4413
   connections with HTTP/1.0 servers, clients using them will need to
4414
   monitor the connection for "hung" requests (which indicate that the
4415
   client ought stop sending the header field), and this mechanism ought
4416
   not be used by clients at all when a proxy is being used.
4417
4418
A.1.3.  Introduction of Transfer-Encoding
4419
4420
   HTTP/1.1 introduces the Transfer-Encoding header field
4421
   (Section 3.3.1).  Transfer codings need to be decoded prior to
4422
   forwarding an HTTP message over a MIME-compliant protocol.
4423
4424
4425
4426
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 79]
4428
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
4429
4430
4431
A.2.  Changes from RFC 2616
4432
4433
   HTTP's approach to error handling has been explained.  (Section 2.5)
4434
4435
   The HTTP-version ABNF production has been clarified to be case-
4436
   sensitive.  Additionally, version numbers have been restricted to
4437
   single digits, due to the fact that implementations are known to
4438
   handle multi-digit version numbers incorrectly.  (Section 2.6)
4439
4440
   Userinfo (i.e., username and password) are now disallowed in HTTP and
4441
   HTTPS URIs, because of security issues related to their transmission
4442
   on the wire.  (Section 2.7.1)
4443
4444
   The HTTPS URI scheme is now defined by this specification;
4445
   previously, it was done in Section 2.4 of [RFC2818].  Furthermore, it
4446
   implies end-to-end security.  (Section 2.7.2)
4447
4448
   HTTP messages can be (and often are) buffered by implementations;
4449
   despite it sometimes being available as a stream, HTTP is
4450
   fundamentally a message-oriented protocol.  Minimum supported sizes
4451
   for various protocol elements have been suggested, to improve
4452
   interoperability.  (Section 3)
4453
4454
   Invalid whitespace around field-names is now required to be rejected,
4455
   because accepting it represents a security vulnerability.  The ABNF
4456
   productions defining header fields now only list the field value.
4457
   (Section 3.2)
4458
4459
   Rules about implicit linear whitespace between certain grammar
4460
   productions have been removed; now whitespace is only allowed where
4461
   specifically defined in the ABNF.  (Section 3.2.3)
4462
4463
   Header fields that span multiple lines ("line folding") are
4464
   deprecated.  (Section 3.2.4)
4465
4466
   The NUL octet is no longer allowed in comment and quoted-string text,
4467
   and handling of backslash-escaping in them has been clarified.  The
4468
   quoted-pair rule no longer allows escaping control characters other
4469
   than HTAB.  Non-US-ASCII content in header fields and the reason
4470
   phrase has been obsoleted and made opaque (the TEXT rule was
4471
   removed).  (Section 3.2.6)
4472
4473
   Bogus Content-Length header fields are now required to be handled as
4474
   errors by recipients.  (Section 3.3.2)
4475
4476
   The algorithm for determining the message body length has been
4477
   clarified to indicate all of the special cases (e.g., driven by
4478
   methods or status codes) that affect it, and that new protocol
4479
4480
4481
4482
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 80]
4484
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
4485
4486
4487
   elements cannot define such special cases.  CONNECT is a new, special
4488
   case in determining message body length. "multipart/byteranges" is no
4489
   longer a way of determining message body length detection.
4490
   (Section 3.3.3)
4491
4492
   The "identity" transfer coding token has been removed.  (Sections 3.3
4493
   and 4)
4494
4495
   Chunk length does not include the count of the octets in the chunk
4496
   header and trailer.  Line folding in chunk extensions is disallowed.
4497
   (Section 4.1)
4498
4499
   The meaning of the "deflate" content coding has been clarified.
4500
   (Section 4.2.2)
4501
4502
   The segment + query components of RFC 3986 have been used to define
4503
   the request-target, instead of abs_path from RFC 1808.  The
4504
   asterisk-form of the request-target is only allowed with the OPTIONS
4505
   method.  (Section 5.3)
4506
4507
   The term "Effective Request URI" has been introduced.  (Section 5.5)
4508
4509
   Gateways do not need to generate Via header fields anymore.
4510
   (Section 5.7.1)
4511
4512
   Exactly when "close" connection options have to be sent has been
4513
   clarified.  Also, "hop-by-hop" header fields are required to appear
4514
   in the Connection header field; just because they're defined as hop-
4515
   by-hop in this specification doesn't exempt them.  (Section 6.1)
4516
4517
   The limit of two connections per server has been removed.  An
4518
   idempotent sequence of requests is no longer required to be retried.
4519
   The requirement to retry requests under certain circumstances when
4520
   the server prematurely closes the connection has been removed.  Also,
4521
   some extraneous requirements about when servers are allowed to close
4522
   connections prematurely have been removed.  (Section 6.3)
4523
4524
   The semantics of the Upgrade header field is now defined in responses
4525
   other than 101 (this was incorporated from [RFC2817]).  Furthermore,
4526
   the ordering in the field value is now significant.  (Section 6.7)
4527
4528
   Empty list elements in list productions (e.g., a list header field
4529
   containing ", ,") have been deprecated.  (Section 7)
4530
4531
   Registration of Transfer Codings now requires IETF Review
4532
   (Section 8.4)
4533
4534
4535
4536
4537
4538
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 81]
4540
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
4541
4542
4543
   This specification now defines the Upgrade Token Registry, previously
4544
   defined in Section 7.2 of [RFC2817].  (Section 8.6)
4545
4546
   The expectation to support HTTP/0.9 requests has been removed.
4547
   (Appendix A)
4548
4549
   Issues with the Keep-Alive and Proxy-Connection header fields in
4550
   requests are pointed out, with use of the latter being discouraged
4551
   altogether.  (Appendix A.1.2)
4552
4553
Appendix B.  Collected ABNF
4554
4555
   BWS = OWS
4556
4557
   Connection = *( "," OWS ) connection-option *( OWS "," [ OWS
4558
    connection-option ] )
4559
4560
   Content-Length = 1*DIGIT
4561
4562
   HTTP-message = start-line *( header-field CRLF ) CRLF [ message-body
4563
    ]
4564
   HTTP-name = %x48.54.54.50 ; HTTP
4565
   HTTP-version = HTTP-name "/" DIGIT "." DIGIT
4566
   Host = uri-host [ ":" port ]
4567
4568
   OWS = *( SP / HTAB )
4569
4570
   RWS = 1*( SP / HTAB )
4571
4572
   TE = [ ( "," / t-codings ) *( OWS "," [ OWS t-codings ] ) ]
4573
   Trailer = *( "," OWS ) field-name *( OWS "," [ OWS field-name ] )
4574
   Transfer-Encoding = *( "," OWS ) transfer-coding *( OWS "," [ OWS
4575
    transfer-coding ] )
4576
4577
   URI-reference = <URI-reference, see [RFC3986], Section 4.1>
4578
   Upgrade = *( "," OWS ) protocol *( OWS "," [ OWS protocol ] )
4579
4580
   Via = *( "," OWS ) ( received-protocol RWS received-by [ RWS comment
4581
    ] ) *( OWS "," [ OWS ( received-protocol RWS received-by [ RWS
4582
    comment ] ) ] )
4583
4584
   absolute-URI = <absolute-URI, see [RFC3986], Section 4.3>
4585
   absolute-form = absolute-URI
4586
   absolute-path = 1*( "/" segment )
4587
   asterisk-form = "*"
4588
   authority = <authority, see [RFC3986], Section 3.2>
4589
   authority-form = authority
4590
4591
4592
4593
4594
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 82]
4596
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
4597
4598
4599
   chunk = chunk-size [ chunk-ext ] CRLF chunk-data CRLF
4600
   chunk-data = 1*OCTET
4601
   chunk-ext = *( ";" chunk-ext-name [ "=" chunk-ext-val ] )
4602
   chunk-ext-name = token
4603
   chunk-ext-val = token / quoted-string
4604
   chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG
4605
   chunked-body = *chunk last-chunk trailer-part CRLF
4606
   comment = "(" *( ctext / quoted-pair / comment ) ")"
4607
   connection-option = token
4608
   ctext = HTAB / SP / %x21-27 ; '!'-'''
4609
    / %x2A-5B ; '*'-'['
4610
    / %x5D-7E ; ']'-'~'
4611
    / obs-text
4612
4613
   field-content = field-vchar [ 1*( SP / HTAB ) field-vchar ]
4614
   field-name = token
4615
   field-value = *( field-content / obs-fold )
4616
   field-vchar = VCHAR / obs-text
4617
   fragment = <fragment, see [RFC3986], Section 3.5>
4618
4619
   header-field = field-name ":" OWS field-value OWS
4620
   http-URI = "http://" authority path-abempty [ "?" query ] [ "#"
4621
    fragment ]
4622
   https-URI = "https://" authority path-abempty [ "?" query ] [ "#"
4623
    fragment ]
4624
4625
   last-chunk = 1*"0" [ chunk-ext ] CRLF
4626
4627
   message-body = *OCTET
4628
   method = token
4629
4630
   obs-fold = CRLF 1*( SP / HTAB )
4631
   obs-text = %x80-FF
4632
   origin-form = absolute-path [ "?" query ]
4633
4634
   partial-URI = relative-part [ "?" query ]
4635
   path-abempty = <path-abempty, see [RFC3986], Section 3.3>
4636
   port = <port, see [RFC3986], Section 3.2.3>
4637
   protocol = protocol-name [ "/" protocol-version ]
4638
   protocol-name = token
4639
   protocol-version = token
4640
   pseudonym = token
4641
4642
   qdtext = HTAB / SP / "!" / %x23-5B ; '#'-'['
4643
    / %x5D-7E ; ']'-'~'
4644
    / obs-text
4645
   query = <query, see [RFC3986], Section 3.4>
4646
   quoted-pair = "\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
4647
4648
4649
4650
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 83]
4652
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
4653
4654
4655
   quoted-string = DQUOTE *( qdtext / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE
4656
4657
   rank = ( "0" [ "." *3DIGIT ] ) / ( "1" [ "." *3"0" ] )
4658
   reason-phrase = *( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
4659
   received-by = ( uri-host [ ":" port ] ) / pseudonym
4660
   received-protocol = [ protocol-name "/" ] protocol-version
4661
   relative-part = <relative-part, see [RFC3986], Section 4.2>
4662
   request-line = method SP request-target SP HTTP-version CRLF
4663
   request-target = origin-form / absolute-form / authority-form /
4664
    asterisk-form
4665
4666
   scheme = <scheme, see [RFC3986], Section 3.1>
4667
   segment = <segment, see [RFC3986], Section 3.3>
4668
   start-line = request-line / status-line
4669
   status-code = 3DIGIT
4670
   status-line = HTTP-version SP status-code SP reason-phrase CRLF
4671
4672
   t-codings = "trailers" / ( transfer-coding [ t-ranking ] )
4673
   t-ranking = OWS ";" OWS "q=" rank
4674
   tchar = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "*" / "+" / "-" / "." /
4675
    "^" / "_" / "`" / "|" / "~" / DIGIT / ALPHA
4676
   token = 1*tchar
4677
   trailer-part = *( header-field CRLF )
4678
   transfer-coding = "chunked" / "compress" / "deflate" / "gzip" /
4679
    transfer-extension
4680
   transfer-extension = token *( OWS ";" OWS transfer-parameter )
4681
   transfer-parameter = token BWS "=" BWS ( token / quoted-string )
4682
4683
   uri-host = <host, see [RFC3986], Section 3.2.2>
4684
4685
4686
4687
4688
4689
4690
4691
4692
4693
4694
4695
4696
4697
4698
4699
4700
4701
4702
4703
4704
4705
4706
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 84]
4708
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
4709
4710
4711
Index
4712
4713
   A
4714
      absolute-form (of request-target)  42
4715
      accelerator  10
4716
      application/http Media Type  63
4717
      asterisk-form (of request-target)  43
4718
      authoritative response  67
4719
      authority-form (of request-target)  42-43
4720
4721
   B
4722
      browser  7
4723
4724
   C
4725
      cache  11
4726
      cacheable  12
4727
      captive portal  11
4728
      chunked (Coding Format)  28, 32, 36
4729
      client  7
4730
      close  51, 56
4731
      compress (Coding Format)  38
4732
      connection  7
4733
      Connection header field  51, 56
4734
      Content-Length header field  30
4735
4736
   D
4737
      deflate (Coding Format)  38
4738
      Delimiters  27
4739
      downstream  10
4740
4741
   E
4742
      effective request URI  45
4743
4744
   G
4745
      gateway  10
4746
      Grammar
4747
         absolute-form  42
4748
         absolute-path  16
4749
         absolute-URI  16
4750
         ALPHA  6
4751
         asterisk-form  41, 43
4752
         authority  16
4753
         authority-form  42-43
4754
         BWS  25
4755
         chunk  36
4756
         chunk-data  36
4757
         chunk-ext  36
4758
         chunk-ext-name  36
4759
4760
4761
4762
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 85]
4764
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
4765
4766
4767
         chunk-ext-val  36
4768
         chunk-size  36
4769
         chunked-body  36
4770
         comment  27
4771
         Connection  51
4772
         connection-option  51
4773
         Content-Length  30
4774
         CR  6
4775
         CRLF  6
4776
         ctext  27
4777
         CTL  6
4778
         DIGIT  6
4779
         DQUOTE  6
4780
         field-content  23
4781
         field-name  23, 40
4782
         field-value  23
4783
         field-vchar  23
4784
         fragment  16
4785
         header-field  23, 37
4786
         HEXDIG  6
4787
         Host  44
4788
         HTAB  6
4789
         HTTP-message  19
4790
         HTTP-name  14
4791
         http-URI  17
4792
         HTTP-version  14
4793
         https-URI  18
4794
         last-chunk  36
4795
         LF  6
4796
         message-body  28
4797
         method  21
4798
         obs-fold  23
4799
         obs-text  27
4800
         OCTET  6
4801
         origin-form  42
4802
         OWS  25
4803
         partial-URI  16
4804
         port  16
4805
         protocol-name  47
4806
         protocol-version  47
4807
         pseudonym  47
4808
         qdtext  27
4809
         query  16
4810
         quoted-pair  27
4811
         quoted-string  27
4812
         rank  39
4813
         reason-phrase  22
4814
         received-by  47
4815
4816
4817
4818
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 86]
4820
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
4821
4822
4823
         received-protocol  47
4824
         request-line  21
4825
         request-target  41
4826
         RWS  25
4827
         scheme  16
4828
         segment  16
4829
         SP  6
4830
         start-line  21
4831
         status-code  22
4832
         status-line  22
4833
         t-codings  39
4834
         t-ranking  39
4835
         tchar  27
4836
         TE  39
4837
         token  27
4838
         Trailer  40
4839
         trailer-part  37
4840
         transfer-coding  35
4841
         Transfer-Encoding  28
4842
         transfer-extension  35
4843
         transfer-parameter  35
4844
         Upgrade  57
4845
         uri-host  16
4846
         URI-reference  16
4847
         VCHAR  6
4848
         Via  47
4849
      gzip (Coding Format)  39
4850
4851
   H
4852
      header field  19
4853
      header section  19
4854
      headers  19
4855
      Host header field  44
4856
      http URI scheme  17
4857
      https URI scheme  17
4858
   I
4859
      inbound  9
4860
      interception proxy  11
4861
      intermediary  9
4862
4863
   M
4864
      Media Type
4865
         application/http  63
4866
         message/http  62
4867
      message  7
4868
      message/http Media Type  62
4869
      method  21
4870
4871
4872
4873
4874
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 87]
4876
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
4877
4878
4879
   N
4880
      non-transforming proxy  49
4881
4882
   O
4883
      origin server  7
4884
      origin-form (of request-target)  42
4885
      outbound  10
4886
4887
   P
4888
      phishing  67
4889
      proxy  10
4890
4891
   R
4892
      recipient  7
4893
      request  7
4894
      request-target  21
4895
      resource  16
4896
      response  7
4897
      reverse proxy  10
4898
4899
   S
4900
      sender  7
4901
      server  7
4902
      spider  7
4903
4904
   T
4905
      target resource  40
4906
      target URI  40
4907
      TE header field  39
4908
      Trailer header field  40
4909
      Transfer-Encoding header field  28
4910
      transforming proxy  49
4911
      transparent proxy  11
4912
      tunnel  10
4913
4914
   U
4915
      Upgrade header field  57
4916
      upstream  9
4917
      URI scheme
4918
         http  17
4919
         https  17
4920
      user agent  7
4921
4922
   V
4923
      Via header field  47
4924
4925
4926
4927
4928
4929
4930
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 88]
4932
RFC 7230           HTTP/1.1 Message Syntax and Routing         June 2014
4933
4934
4935
Authors' Addresses
4936
4937
   Roy T. Fielding (editor)
4938
   Adobe Systems Incorporated
4939
   345 Park Ave
4940
   San Jose, CA  95110
4941
   USA
4942
4943
   EMail: fielding@gbiv.com
4944
   URI:   http://roy.gbiv.com/
4945
4946
4947
   Julian F. Reschke (editor)
4948
   greenbytes GmbH
4949
   Hafenweg 16
4950
   Muenster, NW  48155
4951
   Germany
4952
4953
   EMail: julian.reschke@greenbytes.de
4954
   URI:   http://greenbytes.de/tech/webdav/
4955
4956
4957
4958
4959
4960
4961
4962
4963
4964
4965
4966
4967
4968
4969
4970
4971
4972
4973
4974
4975
4976
4977
4978
4979
4980
4981
4982
4983
4984
4985
4986
Fielding & Reschke           Standards Track                   [Page 89]